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Transplanting a Poison Pill to 
Controlling Shareholder Regimes—
Why It Is So Difficult 
By Sang Yop Kang* 
Abstract: Recently, the great tide of globalization has caused M&A activities to 
spill over into controlling shareholder regimes (economies dominated by 
controlling shareholders).  Due to a seismic change arising from an 
unprecedented takeover wave, transplanting the Delaware pill has been heavily 
discussed in controlling shareholder regimes.  This Article explores how legal 
and socio-economic conditions of the United States (State of Delaware) and 
controlling shareholder regimes are different and why transplanting the 
Delaware pill could create unintended results in controlling shareholder 
regimes.  First, the legitimacy of the Delaware pill is supported by corporate 
governance institutions, such as a relatively functional board, a ballot box safety 
valve, and an efficient judiciary.  Many controlling shareholder jurisdictions, 
however, do not have these lynchpins.  As a result, the transplanted pill in 
controlling shareholder regimes could be absolute and M&A activities would be 
stifled.  Second, the Delaware pill has invited a large number of friendly deals in 
the United States since the market has adjusted to the pill by developing a 
generous severance pay system.  However, such a system is not legally or 
politically permissible in many controlling shareholder regimes.  As a result, the 
transplanted pill would not encourage friendly M&A, but simply entrench target 
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corporate insiders.  Controlling shareholders may be more interested in a 
control premium than severance pay.  The transplanted pill could enhance a 
controlling shareholder’s negotiation leverage and, as a result, the control 
premium.  However, when a control premium should be shared with non-
dominant shareholders by law or social norm, controlling shareholders are 
likely to be reluctant to initiate M&A activities in the first place.  On the other 
hand, when controlling shareholders are allowed to take a substantial fraction 
of control premium, it cuts directly against a core rationale of adopting the pill, 
i.e., protecting weak non-dominant shareholders.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s were characterized as the most vibrant decade of hostile 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the United States.
1
  Most U.S. 
corporations feared being the target of an uninvited acquirer, and heated 
public debates focused on whether the dynamic hostile takeover wave was 
beneficial to the economy.  In 1985, the Delaware judiciary validated the 
 
 1  Professor Merritt B. Fox describes M&A as a mechanism for correcting the managerial 
agency problem: 
Managers face a number of pressures of varying intensity that help align their 
interests with those of shareholders: the threat of legal action for violation of 
fiduciary duties, the threat of hostile takeover, the managerial labor market, the 
evolutionary growth or decline of the firm as the result of succeeding or failing in 
product competition, peer review, the discipline of the outside directors, and the 
threat of removal by dissatisfied shareholders. 
Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory 
of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2098 (1994). 
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legality of the poison pill—the strongest anti-takeover device ever 
invented—in Moran v. Household International, Inc.2  Since most U.S. 
corporations are incorporated in Delaware, and thus fall under Delaware 
law,
3
 the advent of a poison pill virtually crowded out the mechanism of the 
hostile takeover.
4
  To make things worse for critics of the pill, around the 
early 1990s the pill in Delaware finally developed into the “just say no” 
pill, which allowed a board to flatly refuse a bid that was highly attractive 
and non-coercive to shareholders.
5
  While one would expect M&A 
activities to have sharply declined in the United States, they did not.  In 
fact, the M&A wave grew stronger with the evolution of executive 
compensation in the 1990s.
6
  At this time, managers started to accept (or 
acquiesce to) the change in control, since they realized that they could 
benefit from equity-based compensation (e.g., stock options) under a high-
premium bid and depart from corporations with generous severance 
packages.
7
  The practice of granting more lucrative executive compensation 
packages saved the corporate control market from the pill by transforming 
the nature of M&A from “hostile” to “friendly.”8 
Until recently, M&A had been generally deemed a creature of Anglo-
American business culture, and the market for corporate control was 
 
 2  500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding the legality of a poison pill). 
 3  New Jersey was the nation’s incorporation center before 1913.  Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 730 (2002). 
 4  “Takeover bids are no longer a major device for eliminating under-performing 
management because management has devised effective defensive tactics that make 
purchase-type takeovers impractical.  The principal defensive weapon today is a ‘poison pill’ 
(euphemistically called ‘shareholder rights plans’).”  Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate 
Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 
349, 358 (2000).  If a target corporation has a poison pill, an outside bidder is not able to 
acquire, for example, more than 20% of shares of the target.  See infra notes 39–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 5  For an example of the “just say no” pill, see Paramount Commc’n v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  It is noteworthy, however, that the “just say no” pill is not an 
absolute takeover defense device, since it is possible that an outside bidder can use a proxy 
fight in order to overcome the pill.  If the bidder wins a proxy fight in a target corporation, 
she can replace the target’s board and the new board elected by the bidder can redeem the 
pill. 
 6  Executive compensation plans in the United States have relied on stocks and stock 
options as the primary source of compensation since the 1990s.  For a general explanation of 
CEO payment in the United States, see Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, 
and, If So, What If Anything Should Be Done about It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009). 
 7  See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002). 
 8  For example, managers of a target corporation in the United States can enjoy a 
generous severance package when the target corporation is merged into an acquiring 
corporation.  As a result, managers of the target corporation become less reluctant to accept 
an M&A deal.  See infra Part VI. A. 
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virtually nonexistent outside the United States and the United Kingdom.
9
  
This M&A paradigm started to change rapidly around the beginning of the 
new millennium.  Since then, economies outside the United States and 
United Kingdom have observed hostile bids and takeovers (although 
relatively few).
10
  In fact, the great tide of globalization made M&A 
activities spill over internationally, as global entities considered cross-
national acquisitions as feasible options. 
M&A—in particular, the hostile takeover—raises complicated issues 
in any jurisdiction, both economically and socially.
11
  Commentators are 
sharply divided over whether hostile takeovers are beneficial for investors 
and capital market efficiency.
12
  Moreover, even if a merger or acquisition 
produces additional wealth for an entire group of investors in the capital 
market, it might also generate many difficult socio-political questions for a 
local government.  For example, an M&A pursuing cost-reduction and 
synergy is often followed by a massive layoff that can create social unrest.  
If such loss from the employee side is taken into account, value-maximizing 
acquisition for shareholders is not necessarily beneficial to society as a 
whole, even in Kaldor-Hicks terms.
13
  Additionally, when a prospective 
acquirer is a foreign entity, public sentiment could suddenly turn to 
politically flammable nationalism, which can make a cross-border 
acquisition especially difficult.  From a local business perspective, a 
seismic change arising from an unprecedented takeover wave (although 
 
 9  Dynastic succession within dominant family shareholders has been deemed to be a 
business norm in many controlling shareholder economies.  This explanation could be one of 
the reasons why there have been fewer sales of control, particularly in large corporations. 
 10  For example, Mannesmann in Germany, Fuji TV and Bulldog Sauce in Japan, and SK 
Corporation and Hyundai Elevator in Korea were all involved in hostile takeover wars.  See 
infra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
 11  For example, in Japan there is a “social distaste for hostile takeovers.”  Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese 
Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2083 (2001).  Other countries of the 
controlling shareholder regime have exhibited similar hostility towards hostile takeovers.  
For example, during a TV interview, French President Mitterrand warned his audience 
“against takeover mania, against gangsterism, and the rule of the strongest.”  Helen 
Callaghan, Insiders, Outsiders and Politics of Corporate Governance: How Ownership 
Structure Shapes Party Position in Britain, Germany and France, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 733, 
753 (2009). 
 12  Some argue that a hostile takeover is the best disciplinary device to enhance 
shareholder value by diminishing the chronic problem of managerial agency cost.  In 
contrast, others argue that M&A does not create sufficient benefits, pointing out that the net 
value-added to all shareholders (not only those of a target, but also those of an acquirer) is 
almost nothing.  See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 457–58 (4th ed. 2012). 
 13  “A move is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if, in principle, the party who gains can 
compensate the party that loses and still be better off from the move.”  RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, 
ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 72 (2005). 
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weak so far) is an apparent threat to the Ancien Régime.
14
  Accordingly, the 
poison pill is a frequently suggested solution since it has proven to be the 
most effective defense device in U.S. takeover history.
15
  In addition, the 
movement to enact laws, either by statute or case law, permitting the poison 
pill is supported by a slogan of the “global standard”16: “If the United States 
allows the pill, then why don’t we?”17 
To be sure, transplanting is more complicated than mere copying.  
Thus, it is important to analyze in advance whether the poison pill would be 
harmonious with an importing jurisdiction’s socio-political, economic, and 
judicial systems, which are often markedly different from those of the 
United States.  Since few articles, if any, have explored these issues 
comprehensively, this Article will shed light on takeover corporate 
governance scholarship by analyzing interactions between law, economics, 
and culture. 
Most of all, the ownership structure matters when considering the 
consequences of implementing the pill.  In the “dispersed shareholders 
regime,” ownership and control are separated—while shareholding is 
widely dispersed, control belongs to management.
18
  The dispersed 
shareholders regime is, however, a localized phenomenon in the Anglo-
American economies.
19
  In most jurisdictions, the corporate norm is 
principally built on the “controlling shareholder regime,”20 where typically 
a controlling shareholder with a large fraction of voting rights runs the 
business.  When a controlling shareholder uses voting leverage (e.g., stock 
pyramiding), allowing the Delaware “just say no” pill may lead to over-
deterrence of takeovers.
21
  This is because the voting leverage itself is a 
 
 14  Ancien Régime is originally meant to be the old political system in France prior to the 
French Revolution.  In this Article, Ancien Régime refers to an old corporate governance 
regime in controlling shareholder jurisdictions that have not frequently observed M&A. 
 15  See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 4. 
 16  A poison pill might not be a globally recognized takeover defense measure.  
Nonetheless, local business people could argue that adopting a very American takeover 
defense measure—a poison pill—in their legal system is consistent with the global standard, 
since the United States is the largest and most influential economy in the world. 
 17  Recently, this type of argument has prevailed in Japan and Korea, where many 
business-people are concerned about the threat of hostile takeovers from foreign business 
entities. 
 18  See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 19  John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 641 (1999). 
 20  In most countries, dominant shareholders—“usually the State or families”—control 
large corporations.  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 474 (1999). 
 21  In other words, the imported “just say no” pill in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction 
could become a much stronger pill than Delaware’s “just say no” pill. 
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built-in and strong anti-takeover device.  In addition, many countries 
outside the United States do not have the infrastructure that legitimizes the 
pill.  For example, a typical corporation in these countries lacks the 
tradition of having a functional (or relatively independent) board, which is 
designed to keep corporate decision-makers from abusing their power.  
Absent such a board, a pill’s legality is greatly weakened.  Moreover, unlike 
the efficient Delaware courts, most judiciary systems in those countries are 
neither equipped with the expertise required to deal with cutting-edge 




In addition, it cannot be overemphasized that under Delaware 
jurisprudence, a pill is not “absolute” and therefore not unassailable.  
Delaware courts rely on the proposition that shareholders ultimately have 
the power to replace an incumbent board with a new one in order to redeem 
a pill,
23
 if they are dissatisfied with an incumbent’s M&A defense and/or 
continuing business model.  From this perspective, a poison pill is legally 
upheld only when the shareholder franchise is not impeded and distorted by 
corporate insiders.
24
  However, many countries are unlikely to have such a 
“ballot box safety valve.”25  In particular, when the poison pill is adopted in 
a jurisdiction that allows a voting leverage that artificially inflates a 
controlling shareholder’s voting power, the true will of shareholders 
reflecting their weighted cash-flow rights can be replaced in favor of a 
controlling shareholder with small cash-flow rights.  Put simply, 
transplanting only the poison pill without importing complementary 
Delaware corporate governance systems, such as an independent board, an 
efficient judicial system, and safety valves, is akin to wearing a suit jacket 
with pajama pants. 
Although the pill made hostile takeovers virtually impractical, U.S. 
market participants in the 1990s adapted quickly to a pill-dominated, M&A 
climate by restructuring executive compensation
26
 and by accepting a high-
 
 22  Lacking such an important legal infrastructure would seriously discourage a 
prospective acquirer from submitting an uninvited bid in the first place.  In addition, 
uncertainty associated with time-delay would make a pill more powerful than an original 
Delaware pill. 
 23 See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).  “The 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests.”  Id. at 659. 
 24  Id. at 661 (requiring management to demonstrate “compelling justification” for its 
defensive maneuver if the primary purpose of taking such a defensive device interferes with 
the shareholder franchise). 
 25  For the explanation of a “ballot box safety valve,” see Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. 
Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 907–09 (2002). 
 26  U.S. executive compensation is relatively high when compared to other countries.  For 
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premium bid—thus aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.  
Similar market accommodation could be expected to take place in some 
pill-importing jurisdictions.  In countries where social democracy and 
egalitarianism is popular, however, it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to adopt the American-style corporate compensation system 
that tolerates, or even encourages, vast income disparity. 
In a controlling shareholder regime, in general it is not a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), but a dominant shareholder who ultimately 
decides significant business strategies including a defensive measure.  In 
such cases, executive compensation might not be the main variable in a 
complicated equation with respect to a pill and M&A because the driving 
force that encourages a dominant shareholder to sell control is the control 
premium that she is offered rather than a severance package available to 
management.
27
  As long as control is sold for the “appropriate” price, a pill 
would not preclude a friendly deal. 
However, there are potential obstacles to the sale of control based on a 
mutual agreement.  First, the reserve price of controlling shareholders may 
be higher than the offering price of prospective buyers such that deals are 
less likely to take place.
28
  Another impediment arises when the control 
premium must be equally shared among shareholders.  Under such an 
“equal treatment rule,” a controlling shareholder loses a great deal of 
incentive to sell control to a prospective acquirer.  Even if equal treatment 
were not legally required, control sales will be rare in a country with an 
egalitarian culture for precisely the same reason discussed regarding 
executive compensation.  Without accommodating devices, such as 
attractive executive compensation plans and the sale of control markets, if 
the pill is imported, M&A activities (voluntary friendly deals as well as 
hostile takeovers) would be seriously weakened.  As a result, available 
outlets for a failing company would be generally limited to bankruptcy, 
involuntary friendly deals (such as fire sales), and bailouts, which would 
adversely affect the economy.
29
 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II sketches the evolution of the 
 
a critical view on the U.S. executive compensation practice, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005). 
 27  A dominant shareholder could also be paid both the control premium and a severance 
package when she holds an executive position in a corporation. 
 28  It might be, among other reasons, because a founding controlling shareholder deems a 
corporation as her alter ego, and thus attaches more psychic value with the corporation than 
any third party. 
 29  Although an imported poison pill would cause many problems, without the pill a 
corporation in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction has less deterrence compared to its U.S. 
peers.  In order to maintain a similar level of deterrence power by a target corporation, 
additional defense measures—which are less powerful than Delaware’s “just say no” pill—
might be necessary to the legal system in this jurisdiction. 
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poison pill and how Delaware takeover doctrines have been developed in 
relation to the pill.  Part III explores how the U.S. market for corporate 
control has survived the “just say no” pill.  Part IV describes M&A in the 
controlling shareholder regime, which most countries outside the two 
Anglo-American economies adopt.  Part V analyzes the Delaware pill’s 
potential incompatibility with the underlying socio-economic and legal 
infrastructure in an importing jurisdiction.  Part VI explains why, in some 
countries, a pill might stifle not only hostile takeovers, but also voluntary 
and friendly deals.  One reason is that executive compensation and the sale 
of control are not conveniently available in those countries.  Finally, Part 
VII provides concluding remarks. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE POISON PILL AND DELAWARE 
DOCTRINES 
Despite federalization in areas such as disclosure rules
30
 and some 
areas of corporate governance in the United States, corporations are 
nonetheless “creatures of state law.”31  Because a majority of U.S. public 
companies are incorporated in the State of Delaware, Delaware statutory 
and common law governs significant aspects of the takeover landscape in 
the United States.  Therefore, reviewing Delaware doctrines in relation to 
the poison pill can be valuable for a controlling shareholder jurisdiction 
considering adopting an American poison pill. 
A.  The Poison Pill in General: Its Nature and Impacts 
Traditionally, the main tool for hostile takeovers is a proxy contest,
32
 
in which an insurgent attempts to obtain control of a target company using 
the support of colleague shareholders in a directors election.  The proxy 
contest, however, is not an effective method for a would-be acquirer.  The 
proxy machinery is procedurally advantageous for incumbents, so gaining 
the endorsement of the majority of shareholders is a difficult task for an 
insurgent.  In addition, while a hostile bidder shares the benefits from 
replacing a less capable management, it is common that she alone bears the 
 
 30  For more explanation on mandatory disclosure and its related discussion, see Merritt 
B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). 
 31  This expression is often used in the context of U.S. corporate governance.  See, e.g., 
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green et al., 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Corporations are creatures 
of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding 
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with 
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”) 
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). 
 32  Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan’s New Anti-Takeover Defense Guidelines—Part 
1: Some Lessons from Delaware’s Experience in Crafting Fair Takeover Rules, 2 N.Y.U. J. 
L. & BUS. 323, 328 (2006). 
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entire cost of the proxy fight and future managerial efforts.
33
 
Understanding the disadvantages associated with a proxy contest, 
hostile bidders mainly used tender offers from the 1960s.  Reliance on 
tender offers was further strengthened by financial innovations, such as a 
developed junk bond market, in which even a bidder with limited financial 
resources could raise capital to purchase a large fraction of a target’s stocks.  
In this respect, the takeover arena was changed from an “election” to a 
“market,” wherein a would-be acquirer could bypass a target corporation’s 
board by dealing directly with individual shareholders.
34
 
With the advent of the “poison pill” in the 1980s—the colloquial name 
for various “shareholder rights plans”—tender offers made without other 
acquisition maneuvers became powerless.
35
  A poison pill can be adopted 
by a board’s resolution without shareholders’ approval.36  With a pill, target 
shareholders other than the potential acquirer are entitled to purchase 
additional securities of a company
37
 at a bargain price.
38
  The rights become 
exercisable when a specified triggering event takes place,
39
 such as the 
acquisition of 20% of the target’s stock by a third party.  Since the potential 
exercise of the pill would massively dilute the value of the target stock a 
bidder proposes to acquire, she is discouraged from making a bid in the first 
place.
40
  Thus, if a bidder were still interested in the acquisition of a target, 
 
 33  For a general explanation of an insurgent’s difficulties in a proxy contest, see Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007). 
 34  Discussions with Jeffrey N. Gordon, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y 
(discussing corporate law during author’s J.S.D. studies at Columbia Law School, 2010–
2011). 
 35  The official name for a poison pill is the “shareholder rights plan.”  STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 379 (2d ed. 2008); see also CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 779–80 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that poison pills “make takeovers more difficult, 
time consuming, and expensive for an acquirer unless the acquirer negotiates with the 
target’s board of directors” and that “a tender offer against a poison pill can be prohibitively 
expensive.”). 
 36  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 35, at 379; RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE 
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 747 (2d ed. 1995) (“A central characteristic 
of a poison pill plan is that shareholder approval is not required for adoption.”). 
 37  Depending on the types of securities involved, a poison pill can be classified either as 
the flip-over feature (in which securities are a bidding company’s shares) or as the flip-in 
provision (in which securities are a target company’s shares).  O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, 
supra note 35, at 779–80. 
 38  JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 
1086 (7th ed. 2009) (noting that target shareholders can purchase securities “at a significant 
discount from prevailing market price”); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (9th ed. 2005) (noting that target shareholders 
can purchase securities “at a deep discount.”). 
 39  See BAUMAN, supra note 38. 
 40  See EISENBERG, supra note 38, at 1118; see also Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, 
 Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes 
33:619 (2013) 
629 
she would be compelled to negotiate with the target’s board on the terms of 
a bid.
41
  If consent is not reached in that negotiation, the only way for the 
bidder to take control of the target is to wage a proxy contest with the 
incumbent management.
42
  In this sense, the advent of a pill changed the 
arena of a takeover from a “market” to an “election.”43 
In terms of impacts on corporate governance brought by the poison 
pill, there are two contrasting views.  One view is that a pill can be used to 
protect shareholders.  As Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
44
 implies, 
dispersed shareholders are afraid of ending up with worse payoffs if they 
reject an initial tender offer.
45
  Unorganized shareholders are stampeded by 
a hostile bidder to accept even a lowball bid.
46
  With a pill, this coercion 
could be prevented to a large extent because the pill requires a prospective 
bidder to negotiate with the target board that acts as a centralized agent on 
behalf of the shareholders.
47
  In addition, the premium from a takeover can 
be enhanced for the shareholders’ benefit. 
On the other hand, the pill could worsen the managerial agency 
problem.
48
  With the pill, a hostile bidder may find it difficult—if not 
impossible—to prevail in a takeover battle, even if she is welcomed by 
 
supra note 25, at 904 (“[T]he resulting dilution . . . may make the acquisition of the target 
through market purchases too expensive to pursue.”); William B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A 
and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial Perspective, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 45, 49 
(2004) (noting that a triggered poison pill would result in “a massive dilution of an acquiring 
entity’s stock position, thus making it prohibitively more expensive to complete the 
acquisition.”).  However, “[a]ll rights plans have a provision that enables the board to 
‘redeem’ the rights even after they are triggered, for a very nominal sum (say, one penny per 
share).”  Jacobs, supra note 32, at 338. 
 41  See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 358 (“[Due to the poison pill], in the United States 
today, takeover bids are usually negotiated acquisitions rather than truly external bids.”). 
 42  Gordon, supra note 34. 
 43  Id. 
 44  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 45  See id. at 956 (“It is now well recognized that such [two-tiered coercive] offers are a 
classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, 
even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the 
transaction.”). 
 46  Id. 
 47  “[Shareholders’ rights] plans are an example of lawyers using general powers in a new 
way to make takeovers more difficult, time consuming, and expensive for an acquirer unless 
the acquirer negotiates with the target’s board of directors.”  O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra 
note 35, at 779. 
 48  In a corporation, managers have decision-making power.  The managerial agency 
problem arises from the fact that managers, who are agents of shareholders, can use this 
power for their own interests and at the expense of shareholders.  For a general explanation 
of agency problems, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:619 (2013) 
630 
most shareholders of a target corporation.
49
  Even worse, in a corporation 
without a poison pill, it takes only a few hours for a board to adopt a pill 
because shareholder approval is not necessary—all that is required is a 
board meeting and subsequent board approval.
50
  Put differently, every 
corporation inherently has a shareholder rights plan—although not at the 
time of a hostile bid—in the form of a “shadow” pill.51  As Professor 
Grundfest articulates, the hostile takeover wars are now over, and 
management has won.
52
  Although disgruntled shareholders and the 
prospective acquirer have an opportunity to replace the board through a 
proxy fight, it is an uphill battle since a proxy fight is both cost-inefficient 
and time-consuming.  As such, the poison pill works as a near-impermeable 
armor that insulates incumbent management from the threat of hostile 
takeovers. 
B.  Unocal’s Proportionality Test: Intermediate Standard and Harbinger of 
the Pill 
By the mid-1980s, when the wave of hostile takeovers reached its 
peak, Delaware courts had a doctrinal dilemma in takeover cases.  Under 
the business judgment presumption,
53
 a court was not permitted to second-
guess the legality of a board’s decision unless a plaintiff rebutted the 
presumption.
54
  This highly deferential standard in favor of the board
55
 
could have over-protected directors who were inherently involved in the 
 
 49  Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with 
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993). 
 50  See John Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 286–87 (2000). 
 51  Id. at 288 (“Another way of putting the point is that once the Delaware Supreme Court 
made it clear in Moran v. Household International that pills were legitimate, all Delaware 
firms . . . have had a shadow pill in place, witting or not.”). 
 52  Grundfest, supra note 49, at 858 (“The takeover wars are over.  Management won.  
Although hostile tender offers remain technically possible, the legal and financial barriers in 
their path are far higher today than they were a few short years ago.  As a result, it will be 
difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in takeover battles, even if shareholders support the 
insurgents’ efforts.  Future acquisitions will therefore more frequently involve consensual 
transactions.”). 
 53  The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 54  For more explanation on the business judgment rule, see S. Samuel Arsht, The 
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979). 
 55  “[T]he business judgment rule means that courts will not decide (or allow a jury to 
decide) whether the decisions of corporate boards are either substantively reasonable by the 
‘reasonable prudent person’ test or sufficiently well informed by the same test.”  ALLEN, 
KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 228. 
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“omnipresent specter”56 of the agency problem, particularly in M&A cases 
where managers and directors would lose their jobs.
57
  In contrast, under the 
entire fairness review,
58
 directors and managers had to prove that the 
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation in terms of both the process 
and the price.
59
  Under this stringent doctrine, the board could not have 
implemented defensive devices against potentially coercive two-tiered 
offers for fear that the defense would be invalidated.
60
  Without any 
defensive device, shareholders would be worse off. 
Recognizing these problems, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Unocal, 
put forward an “intermediate (or proportional) standard,” compromising the 
two traditional standards of review.
61
  Under the Unocal standard, the board 
must demonstrate that a takeover bid generated “reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”62 and 
that the defensive measure adopted was “reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.”63  After satisfying these conditions, the board’s conduct in a hostile 
takeover may then be evaluated under the business judgment rule.
64
 
It is noteworthy that Unocal itself had nothing to do with a poison 
pill.
65
  In Unocal, the target (Unocal Corp.) implemented a self-tender as a 
defense tactic, excluding only Mesa Petroleum, an unwanted suitor, so that 
Mesa’s economic interest would be massively diluted.66  Fearful of this 
economic damage, Mesa was deterred from closing in to complete a hostile 
takeover and ultimately brought suit.
67
  The court held that Unocal’s 
selective self-tender satisfied the two-pronged proportionality test, and the 
court legitimized the board’s conduct of discriminating against an insurgent 
 
 56  The Unocal court was concerned about the “omnipresent specter that a board may be 
acting primarily in its own interest rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.”  
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 57  John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile Takeover 
Regimes in the Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 219, 244 (2011). 
 58  As for the entire fairness review, see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983).     
 59  Id. at 711; see also Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 57 at 244.   
 60  See Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 244 n.114. 
 61  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.    
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  See id. at 958; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 777. 
 65  See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949 (“We confront an issue of first impression in Delaware—
the validity of a corporation’s self-tender for its own shares which excludes from 
participation a stockholder making a hostile tender offer for the company’s stock.”).  The 
issue in Unocal was whether a corporation’s discriminatory self-tender, rather than a poison 
pill, was valid. 
 66  Id. at 950–51. 
 67  Id. 
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shareholder in the takeover context.  After Unocal, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule 14d-10, prohibiting 
selective self-tenders.
68
  Nonetheless, the “general principle” articulated in 
Unocal has been unchanged: an anti-takeover device discriminating against 
a hostile bidder/shareholder could be allowed as long as the proportionality 
test is passed, unless that device is a selective self-tender.  In this manner, 
Unocal paved the way for approving the legality of a poison pill, which is 
dependent upon discriminatory treatment among shareholders.
69
 
C.  The Evolution of the Poison Pill to the “Just Say No” Defense 
In the same year Unocal was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court, in 
Moran, upheld the legality of a (flip-over) poison pill.
70
  The underlying 
reasoning was that the two-pronged proportionality test was satisfied and a 
(prospective) bidder could still rely on a proxy contest through which a 
newly-elected board could redeem the pill.
71
  A few years later, the 
Delaware Chancery Court opined in City Capital Associates v. Interco 
Inc.
72
 that a target board had to redeem a poison pill if it was used against a 
non-coercive tender offer.
73
  Accordingly, the shareholders’ right to sell 
their shares was restored without the obstacle of a continued pill, unless 
they were coerced by a bid.  A corporate raider was another beneficiary of 
the case, since under Interco she gained a substantial chance to triumph in a 
hostile takeover without relying on a highly burdensome proxy contest. 
The Interco regime, however, was soon struck down by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc.74  Although 
Paramount announced an all-cash 100% non-coercive tender offer for Time 
 
 68  See Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2006); O’KELLEY 
& THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 778. 
 69  Discussions with Katharina Pistor, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
(discussing corporate law during author’s J.S.D. studies at Columbia Law School, 2010–
2011). 
 70  Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985).  As Professors 
O’Kelley and Thompson note, some courts in the United States have found poison pills 
discriminatory and illegal.  O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 787.  “However, in 
each case in which a court has challenged the board’s authority to enact a poison pill, the 
affected state’s legislature has followed with a statute authorizing the pills.  Indeed, many 
states have enacted statutes even if there has not been an invalidating judicial decision in that 
jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 71  See generally Moran, 500 A.2d 1346.  In this sense, it can be said that after Moran the 
Delaware court expressed preference for the “election” over the “market” as a solution for 
the conflict generated in a corporate control contest. 
 72  551 A. 2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).  As to the Interco pill’s relative deterrence power, see 
infra notes 213–218 and accompanying text. 
 73  See Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25, at 905–06. 
 74  571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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at a substantial premium,
75
 Time’s board refused to redeem a pill, asserting 
that the price was inadequate.  Reviewing this case, the Delaware Supreme 
Court stated that the “threat” examined in the Unocal test included 
shareholders’ “ignorance or mistaken belief” of the strategic benefit from a 
target board’s favored business combination (i.e., the Time-Warner 
merger).
76
  These statements seem to be based on the notion that a target 
board may know more than the market does.
77
  Accordingly, a “wise” 
board, which is assumed to be a faithful agent who cares primarily for 
shareholders’ interest, is allowed to force “foolish” shareholders not to sell 
their shares to the unwanted bidder.  In other words, a board can “just say 
no”78 to redeem the pill even in a non-coercive and high-premium bid. 
III. HOW DEALS SURVIVE UNDER “JUST SAY NO” IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
So far, the “just say no” pill in Time has remained valid in Delaware 
takeover law.
79
  This Part first sketches the pill’s two safety valves,80 and 
then explains how an effective staggered board
81
 can render a ballot box’s 
safety valve powerless.  This Part further explains a puzzling U.S. 
phenomenon: M&A activities have thrived despite the highly potent 
defensive combination of a poison pill and a staggered board. 
 
 75  The final bid price reached $200 per share for Time, while the stock price of Time 
before Paramount’s initial bid was only $126 per share.  Id. at 1147, 1149. 
 76  Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 523 (1997); see 
also Time, 571 A.2d at 1147. 
 77  Under the semi-strong version of efficient market hypothesis, “the stock market price 
of an actively traded company’s stock will reflect all relevant publicly available 
information.”  STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 32–33 (3d ed. 2012).  Thus, it is possible that the price of a corporation’s stock 
does not reflect inside information that the corporate insiders know but the market does not 
know.  In this sense, it is known that under the semi-strong version, the market price of a 
corporation’s stock could be inaccurate from the eyes of corporate insiders. 
 78  While the “just say no” pill can theoretically be defeated, there is no empirical support 
for such a possibility.  See Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25, at 906 
(“While Delaware jurisprudence does not say that courts will never order the redemption of a 
poison pill, there has not been since Time a single case in which redemption of a pill was 
ordered by a Delaware court.  Thus, as a practical matter, a bidder has had to assume in 
planning a bid that a target could ‘just say no’ and retain a pill unless and until the bidder 
obtained majority control of the target’s board.”). 
 79  As noted, most public corporations in the United States are incorporated in Delaware.  
See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3. Thus, Delaware takeover law plays a key role 
in U.S. takeover law. 
 80  Commentators widely use the term “safety valves,” which refer to the limitations of 
“just say no.”  See generally Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25. 
 81  As for an effective staggered board, see id. 
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A.  Two Safety Valves and “Just Say No” 
Under the Time regime, the shareholders’ only recourse in the face of a 
board’s “just say no” pill is to replace the existing directors.82  In fact, this 
is why the pill satisfies the proportionality test and is legitimate.  Although 
a board can refuse an acquisition by using a pill that blocks transactions 
between a prospective acquirer and shareholders, ultimately shareholders 
can make the final and fundamental decision on the M&A via their 
confidence votes for an incumbent board.
83
  This ballot box safety valve 
keeps the “just say no” pill in check.  Thus, maintaining the shareholders’ 
franchise unscathed is the essential foundation for the legality of a poison 
pill.  In this respect, Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
84
 is important.  In 
the specific context of a contested election for directors, a board has the 
burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for its defensive actions, 
if the primary purpose of such actions is to interfere with the effectiveness 
of the shareholders’ franchise.85 
Another safety valve available to shareholders for the “just say no” pill 
is proposed in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes.
86
  When a board is to 
abandon its independence and enter into particular modes such as selling a 
company, breaking it up, or selling control (all of which are irreversible for 
shareholders), the board’s decision on the takeover defense strategy is 
subject to the Revlon standard, which is more stringent than Unocal.
87
  Now 
the board’s role must change from a defender of a corporation to a neutral 
auctioneer charged with the duty to maximize the sale price of a corporation 
for the shareholders.
88
  A board’s discretion as to whether to take into 
consideration the stakeholders such as “creditors, customers, employees, 
and perhaps even the community generally” (as was argued in Unocal)89 no 
longer exists in Revlon, under which shareholder wealth maximization is 
the board’s only goal. 
B.  How Safety Valves Have Been Weakened 
The Revlon duty was further developed in Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. 
 
 82  Gordon, supra note 76, at 523. 
 83  For example, relying on the Court of Chancery, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
explains that a pill does not limit shareholders’ voting power.  Moran v. Household Int’l, 
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985). 
 84  564 A.2d  651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 85  Id. at 661; Discussions with Curtis J. Milhaupt, Professor, Columbia Law School, in 
N.Y.C., N.Y. (discussing corporate law during author’s J.S.D. studies at Columbia Law 
School, 2010–2011). 
 86  506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 87  See id. at 182. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 





  Nonetheless, Delaware courts have rarely recognized 
the Revlon duty.
91
  In practice, the ballot box (Blasius) safety valve imposes 
only limited constraints on management’s “just say no” defense.  As 
discussed, since the proxy contest is far more advantageous to an incumbent 
than a challenger, shareholder voting does not precisely reflect the will of 
shareholders on the control contest issue.  In addition, since shareholder 
meetings usually take place once a year, a prospective acquirer has to 
adhere to a particular timeframe in order to mount a proxy fight.  Therefore, 
a prospective acquirer may give up taking part in the corporate control 
contest in the first place if the timing is not favorable.
92
 
Perhaps the most powerful device to nearly incapacitate the ballot box 
safety valve is a staggered board
93
 implementing a poison pill.  When a 
board is staggered based on a charter provision, both a shareholder approval 
and a board resolution are necessary in order to dismantle the staggered 
board.  Since a staggered board usually consists of three classes,
94
 a hostile 
bidder is required to win two proxy contests in a row in order to take 
control of the board.  Then the board, which is under control of the hostile 
bidder, will redeem a poison pill.  Thus, an incumbent has more incentives 
to fight since it can successfully fend off a hostile bid by winning only one 
of two consecutive elections.
95
  In addition, winning two consecutive 
elections means that it will take more than a year for a prospective acquirer 
to take control of a target.  Since expediting a takeover process is key in 
terms of reducing uncertainty, this protracted timetable discourages a bidder 
from initiating a hostile takeover in the first place.
96
  For the foregoing 
reasons, a staggered board—if it is not dismantled or “packed” by an 
 
 90  637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  Under QVC, if the control is transferred from public 
dispersed shareholders (i.e., the market) to a single person, entity, or group, the Revlon-mode 
is triggered and a board has to discharge its fiduciary duty to sell the company to the bidder 
with the highest value reasonably available.  Id. at 43. 
 91  Pistor, supra note 69. 
 92  See Gordon, supra note 76. 
 93  ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 156 (“Each year, holders of 
voting stock elect either the whole board, when there is a single class of directors, or some 
fraction of the board.  For example, shareholders elect one-third of the board annually when 
the charter provides for a ‘staggered’ or ‘classified’ board made up of three ‘classes’ of 
directors, each serving three-year terms.”). 
 94  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010). 
 95  Under a staggered board with three classes, if a hostile bidder wins the first year proxy 
contest, she can replace one third of the target board.  After that, if the incumbent wins the 
second year proxy contest, the hostile bidder still maintains only one third of the target 
board.  At this moment, the hostile bidder is likely to give up the third year proxy contest for 
mainly two reasons.  First, the bidder is not sure whether she will win the third year proxy 
contest.  Second, even if the bidder ultimately wins, too much time and resources would be 
spent in order to acquire the target, which is inefficient to the bidder. 
 96  See generally Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25. 
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insurgent within a year
97—is referred to as an effective staggered board 
(ESB), which makes a corporation almost invincible when it adopts a pill.
98
 
C.  How M&A Activities Survive: Golden Parachutes and Equity-Based 
Compensation 
A great number of U.S. corporations were exposed to the threat of 
hostile takeovers in the 1980s.  Soon after the “just say no” defense was 
firmly established in Delaware jurisprudence, however, the wave of hostile 
takeovers ebbed.  A careful board that was advised by good lawyers and 
investment bankers could figure out how to avoid triggering Blasius and 
Revlon standards under which defensive conduct would be reviewed more 
stringently than under the deferential Unocal (or the even more watered-
down Unocal/Unitrin
99
) standard.  Furthermore, a target became 
impenetrable with the combination of an ESB and the “just say no” pill.  
Interestingly, however, the market for corporate control has flourished.  
Since the middle of the 1990s, the nature of M&A has become 
“friendly.”100  To corporate insiders, being acquired was a disaster until the 
1990s—as a result of an acquisition, corporate insiders lost jobs, high 
compensation and perquisites, and psychic utility
101
 from running a 
company.  In order to avoid these losses, a target management objected to 
bids even though the price and terms were attractive to shareholders.  The 
“omnipresent specter”102 of the agency problem weakened the mechanism 
of a hostile takeover, which was a market device to discipline corporate 
insiders. 
However, the evolution of executive compensation changed this 
situation.  The typical executive’s compensation is chiefly composed of a 
salary, a bonus, and equity-based compensation (e.g., stock options).
103
  In 
the 1990s, stock options became one major component of the executive 
compensation.
104
  The idea behind this development was to redress the 
 
 97  Id. at 894. 
 98  Id. at 899. 
 99  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 100 Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 880 (quoting Joseph H. Flom, Merger & Acquisitions: 
The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753, 761–72 (2000)). 
 101 While corporate insiders run corporations, they enjoy psychic utility since their 
position comes with social prestige, reputation, and social influence, including political 
power.  “Psychic utility” and “non-pecuniary benefits of control” are used interchangeably in 
this Article.  As for non-pecuniary benefits, see Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders 
and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1641, 1661–73 (2006). 
 102 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 103 As for executive compensation and its problems, see generally Bebchuk & Fried, 
supra note 26. 
 104 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
 Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes 
33:619 (2013) 
637 
agency problem by aligning the interests of executives and shareholders—if 
management performed well and stock price went up, management as well 
as shareholders benefited from the increased stock price.  It is well known 
that stock options based on such high-powered incentives were supported 
by tax and accounting rules.  The end result was an explosive increase in a 




During this period, a generous severance package, or “golden 
parachute,” was developed as well.106  A typical golden parachute provided 
a departing executive with the average bonus of prior years as well as three 
times of the executive’s salary.107  In addition, in the case of a change-in-
control transaction, the parachute also included the accelerated vesting of 
stock options that had been granted but were not yet vested.
108
  In other 
words, an executive in a target corporation could receive substantial gains 
in the event of a premium acquisition
109
 even though the executive made no 
contribution to the acquisition.
110
  As a result, management did not fiercely 
oppose being acquired; rather, management started to acquiesce to or 
welcome deals.
111
  When personal benefits were large enough, management 
had a strong incentive to use defense devices as a bargaining tool in order to 
sell a corporation at a higher price.
112
  
IV. THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME AND THE 
MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
To this point, this Article has analyzed the doctrines and precedents 
 
2005: of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1530–31 
(2007).  “Executives can reap substantial financial benefits from stock options when their 
company is acquired in a premium bid.  These benefits are multiplied by golden parachutes, 
which provide for severance payments, benefits, early vesting of pension rights, and 
accelerated vesting of unvested options.”  Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 884. 
 105 Gordon, supra note 104, at 1530–31. 
 106 Golden parachutes emerged in the 1980s in response to hostile takeovers.  See Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for 
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 331 (2009). 
 107 Gordon, supra note 104, at 1533. 
 108 Id. at 1533–34. 
 109 Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25, at 908; Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 7, at 884. 
 110 An outside bidder is able to offer a high-premium bid since she believes the current 
stock price of the target is undervalued.  The target’s underperforming management team 
may be the reason for the target’s depressed stock price.  Nonetheless, the target’s 
management team will benefit from golden parachutes and equity-based compensation if an 
M&A deal is consummated.  However, if a high-premium bid is the result of negotiation, it 
can be said that the target management contributes to the highball bid. 
 111 See Gordon, supra note 104, at 1534; Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 896. 
 112 See Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25, at 908. 
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relating to hostile takeovers and defenses in Delaware.  Against this 
backdrop, this Part discusses the potential consequences for the M&A 
market if the controlling shareholder regime implements a poison pill in its 
corporate law system. 
A.  The Controlling Shareholder Regime and Takeover Defense 
Based on ownership structures, the world economy is classified into 
two groups: (1) the dispersed shareholder regime found in the United States 
and United Kingdom, where the control of a public corporation is generally 
in the hands of public shareholders; and (2) the controlling shareholder 
regime in which a single person (or a group of dominant shareholders) can 
exercise effective voting control, not necessarily with corresponding equity 
holdings.
113
  Companies with a controlling shareholder are the dominant 
form among publicly traded firms in most countries outside these two 
Anglo-American economies.
114
  Until recently, M&A (particularly that 
which is initiated by a hostile bid) has been considered a phenomenon 
localized in the two dispersed shareholder economies. 
As globalization developed and spread, corporate insiders in the rest of 
the world gradually came under pressure from the market for corporate 
control.  For instance, in Japan, Livedoor and Steel Partners initiated hostile 
takeover bids, with Livedoor bidding on Fuji TV and Steel Partners bidding 
on Yushiro Chemical Industries and Soto.
115
  In Germany, Vodafone 
(headquartered in the United Kingdom) successfully took over 
Mannesmann.
116
  In Korea, Sovereign Asset Management—a foreign 
fund—almost caused one of Korea’s largest conglomerates, SK Group, to 




 113 Gilson, supra note 101, at 1643. 
 114 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance 
Research 14 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion 
Paper No. 652, 2009), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_652.pdf. 
 115 Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2178–80 (2005).  Steel Partners’ tender offer for Bull-Dog 
Sauce is another example of hostile takeover attempts in Japan.  See Armour, Jacobs & 
Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 255. 
 116 Vodafone Seals Mannesmann Deal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/630293.stm. 
 117 See infra notes 143–148 and accompanying text; see also Press Release of Sovereign 
Global Investment, Sovereign Seeks Reform at SK Corporation (Apr. 14, 2003), 
http://www.sovereignglobal.com/4_1_1en.asp?ItemID=6 (“Crest Securities Limited 
recently became the single largest shareholder in SK Corporation ( ‘SKC’).  Crest 
Securities Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sovereign Asset Management 
Limited (‘Sovereign’) based in Monaco.  Sovereign is a long-term investor without 
any affiliation to SKC’s existing shareholders or management.  It is making this 
statement in response to media interest regarding the purpose of the investment in 
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Accordingly, there has been a growing concern within business circles 
about the expansion of corporate control contests because business elites 
themselves will be the most apparent victims in hostile takeovers.  Since the 
changed rules in the corporate control game may generate adverse impacts 
on economic and political stability (such as massive layoffs due to 
acquisitions of domestic firms), governments have become more wary 
about this global trend and have made attempts to redesign anti-takeover 
systems.  Local business lobbies strengthen such government movements. 
In this respect, importing the Delaware poison pill system could be an 
attractive solution to relieve the fear of potential hostile takeovers, since the 
pill is an effective and less costly defensive device.  Above all, as proven by 
U.S. takeover history, a pill makes a company almost takeover-proof.
118
  In 
addition, as mentioned above, a pill does not require shareholders’ 
approval—only a board’s resolution is necessary.119  Thus, a company can 
adopt a pill very quickly, such as when a company notices “abnormal” 
movement in a stock market via early warning systems, such as 13D filings.  
Moreover, a pill does not affect any significant strategic business plans or 
the financial status of a company beyond deterring a hostile takeover.
120
 
Suppose that a pill is not available in a particular jurisdiction.  Facing a 
hostile bid, a target company could, for example, sell to a third party an 
important asset that a hostile bidder is interested in acquiring.  
Alternatively, a target could issue debt securities or assume obligations so 
that the capital structure of the firm is significantly changed.  The target is 
then no longer the attractive firm that the prospective acquirer had pursued.  
As a result, the target can preserve its independence.  The problem, 
however, is that the target corporation is harmed as well by its own decision 
to sell the crown jewels (sometimes at a fire sale price) or to change the 
capital structure since such defensive strategies would depress firm value 
and damage business opportunities in the future.  In contrast, the effect of 
adopting a poison pill is either to deter a hostile bid or to negotiate the terms 
of acquisition without damaging the target itself. 
B.  Dominant Shareholders: Their Identity and Ownership Structure 
As explained, amid the changing M&A landscape, dominant 
shareholders in controlling shareholder regimes have made attempts to 
neutralize hostile bids by adopting new defensive measures in their 
jurisdictions.  Before analyzing the anticipated consequences of adopting a 
poison pill in such a jurisdiction, this Article starts by describing the 
 
SKC.”). 
 118 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 875. 
 119 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 35. 
 120 See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 875. 
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identities of dominant shareholders.  Basically, there are primarily two 
types of dominant shareholders.
121
  One is the government.
122
  For instance, 
a substantial fraction of Chinese economy is under the direct or indirect 
control by the Chinese government through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
The other common group of controlling shareholders is families, who are 
ubiquitous in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and even the United States.
123
  
This Article studies this second group. 
Ownership structures that controlling shareholders rely on are 
important to analyze.  The primary factor that determines corporate control 
is not the economic stake a dominant shareholder holds in a corporation, but 
the voting power she can exercise.
124
  Until recently, most commentators 
have analyzed the controlling shareholder system based on a controlled 
structure (CS) model in which a single shareholder owns a majority or large 
plurality of a company’s shares.125  However, the CS model does not cover 
the ownership structure of all controlled companies.
126
  The other half of the 
picture can be explained as a controlling-minority structure (CMS), in 
which a dominant shareholder is able to exercise control over a corporation 
while holding only a fraction of its equity
127—for example, while a 
dominant shareholder may hold only 5% of cash-flow rights, she may still 
exercise effective control over a company.  According to Professors 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, such a radical separation of voting rights 
and cash-flow rights can occur in three principal ways: dual-class equity 
structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties.
128
 
C.  Dominant Shareholders and Anti-Takeover Defenses 
A dominant shareholder perhaps does not need a pill if she holds 
“absolute” control (i.e., more than 51% of voting rights).  However, many 
controlling shareholders in the world do not hold absolute control—as long 
as the rest shareholders are widely dispersed, a shareholder with less than 
50% of all votes can control a corporation.  In this latter case, a dominant 
 
 121 As for the corporate ownership in the world, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer, supra note 20. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Although the economic stake and voting power are generally related, ultimately it is 
the voting power that gives a dominant shareholder control over a corporation. 
 125 See Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-
Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating 
Control from Cash Flow Rights 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6951, 1999). 
 126 See id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
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shareholder may consider a poison pill to fend off a hostile bid completely. 
1.  CMS: “Internal Defensive Device” 
When a controlling shareholder refuses a high-premium bid that will 
be beneficial to shareholders as a whole, a controlling shareholder in a CS 
company has more legitimacy than one in a CMS company.  This is 
because a CS controlling shareholder has a significant holding of economic 
interest corresponding to her voting rights, while a CMS controlling 
shareholder wields the control by voting leverage without corresponding 
economic interest.  Also, a CS controlling shareholder is the very person 
who will lose opportunity cost the most when she does not accept an 
attractive bid from outside, since her economic interest in a corporation is 
large.  On the other hand, the opportunity cost for a CMS controlling 
shareholder is minimal by comparison, since her economic interest in a 
corporation is relatively small.  
Consider the CMS in terms of a defense device.  Suppose that the top 
executives in a widely-held U.S. corporation hold 5% of the corporation’s 
economic interest.  Facing a takeover bid, they urge the board to adopt a 
poison pill.  Suppose also that the board agrees with management.  
Accordingly, the threat is eliminated and executives can continue to manage 
the corporation.  On the other hand, suppose that there is a controlling 
shareholder in a CMS company outside the United States who holds 5% of 
the economic interest in the company and wields 51% of voting control.  
Here, the controlling shareholder, as opposed to the executives, does not 
need a pill to quell a hostile bid, although the controlling shareholder and 
executives have the same amount of economic interest in each company.  In 
this sense, the CMS itself is a strong “internal defensive device” similar to a 
poison pill. 
In fact, Germany opposed the European Takeover Directive in June 
2000 based on its corporations’ comparative disadvantage in terms of 
voting power.
129
  The goal of the European Takeover Directive was to lower 
the barriers for takeovers within the European Union and to establish 
common standards for such transactions.
130
  To these ends, strict neutrality 
on the board of a target company was required.
131
  Germany believed, 
however, that its firms were more open to a takeover threat than were firms 
from France or Scandinavian member states since these countries continued 
to allow multiple voting rights.
132
  Likewise, the CMS—which has multiple 
 
 129 CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE 
CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 
80 (2008). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 81. 
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voting rights—is able to block most hostile takeover attempts as an internal 
defense device of an ownership structure. 
2.  Dominant Shareholders Often Do Not Have a Majority of Voting Rights 
As to the definition of “control,” the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Perlman v. Feldmann is worth noting.
133
  Feldmann, who held 33% of 
Newport, planned to sell his holding and shares held by his friends and 
associates (totaling 37% of the Newport stock) to a third party, Wilport, for 
a control premium.
134
  The court held, seemingly in opposition to the 
established principle regarding the sale of control in the United States, that 
a dominant shareholder may not sell control at a premium if it would 
exclude non-dominant shareholders from reaping the profits.
135
  Although a 
crucial point in Feldmann is whether non-dominant shareholders are 
entitled to share in control premiums, this Article emphasizes that the court 
deemed Feldmann to be a controlling shareholder despite the fact that he 
held only 33% (or 37% if including the shares of his friends and associates) 
of outstanding Newport stock.  The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
Panel) in the United Kingdom, an independent body that supervises and 
regulates takeovers and other matters, has a similar position.
136
  According 
to the Panel, “30% of the voting rights of a company is treated by the Code 
as the level at which effective control is obtained.”137 
When the rest of the shareholders are widely-dispersed and do not 
collaborate to form one opposing group, a shareholder with less than a 
majority of votes can exercise control more easily.  It is true, however, that 
this controlling shareholder is exposed to the potential threat of a hostile 
takeover, unlike a controlling shareholder with 51% of voting rights, who 
can absolutely defend her controlled corporation.  Thus, a controlling 
shareholder with less than a majority of votes may be interested in a new 
anti-takeover device, such as a poison pill, and may urge the government, 
legislature, or judiciary to adopt a new law that allows the implementation 
of a pill in a target company. 
3.  A Tale of Two Cities: Hostile Takeover Attempts in Tokyo and Seoul 
It is worthwhile to study two takeover attempts in Japan and Korea.  In 
these countries, business groups are dominant players in their economies 
 
 133 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 134 Id. at 174. 
 135 Id. at 178; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 793–94 (2003). 
 136 Home, THE TAKEOVER PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 
30, 2013). 
 137 See The Code (Including Downloads), THE TAKEOVER PANEL, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/download-code (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). 
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and until recently hostile takeovers were almost nonexistent.  In February 
2005, Japanese internet service provider Livedoor (whose CEO was 
Takafumi Horie), initiated a takeover bid for Nippon Broadcasting System, 
Inc. (Nippon Broadcasting) when Livedoor owned roughly 38% of Nippon 
Broadcasting’s stock.138  Nippon Broadcasting was a subsidiary of Fuji 
Television Network, Inc. (Fuji TV), which is the virtual headquarters of the 
Fuji Sankei media group.  Interestingly, Nippon Broadcasting, a subsidiary 
of Fuji TV, held 22.5% of Fuji TV’s shares, while Fuji TV held only 12.4% 
of Nippon Broadcasting’s shares.139  As a defense measure, Nippon 
Broadcasting considered issuing warrants to Fuji TV in order to strengthen 
Fuji TV’s control position and dilute Livedoor’s stake.140  Livedoor sued to 
enjoin this defensive measure, and the courts (Tokyo District Court and the 
High Court) ruled in favor of Livedoor.
141
  As a result, Livedoor obtained a 
controlling interest in Nippon Broadcasting.  Eventually this battle for 
control was resolved peacefully.  Livedoor sold its Nippon Broadcasting 
shares to Fuji TV, and in return Fuji TV obtained a fractional stake in 
Livedoor for a capital infusion.
142
 
A more dynamic episode took place in Seoul, South Korea, where 
controlling family shareholders commonly use intra-shareholding for their 
control in chaebols (business groups).  In April 2003, Sovereign Asset 
Management Limited (Sovereign)
143
 acquired 14.9% of the outstanding 
shares of SK Corporation (SKC), the largest oil refiner in Korea.
144
  SKC 
was important strategically because it was the de facto holding company in 
SK Group and a large shareholder of SK Telecommunication (SKT), the 
largest telecommunication company in Korea.
145
  According to Korean 
 
 138 Milhaupt, supra note 115, at 2179. 
 139 Id. at 2178. 
 140 Id. at 2179. 
 141 See id. at 2179–80. 
 142 Id. at 2180. 
 143 Sovereign was founded by New Zealanders Richard and Christopher Chandler.  Sang-
Bae Lee, Hanguk tteonan Sovereign, Eotteon Hoesainga?  (한국 떠난 소버린, 어떤 
회사인가?) [Sovereign Is Leaving—What Kind of Corporation Is Sovereign?], Meonitudei 
(머니투데이) [MONEY TODAY] (Aug. 23, 2005), (S. Kor.), 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2005082311393489289&outlink=1.  
Sovereign is a private investment institution investing in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin 
America.  See id. 
 144 Young-Han Ji, Sovereign 15% Jibun Budam “Sangsangchowol” (소버린 15%지분 
부담 “상상초월”) [Burden of SK Telecommunication Will Be “More than Imaginable” If 
Sovereign Acquires More Than 15% of SK Corporation], NAVER (Apr. 16, 2003), (S. Kor.), 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=101&oid=018&aid=000
0026625. 
 145 SK Group is one of the largest corporate groups in Korea.  As of 2012, SK Group is 
the sixty-fifth largest business entity in the world.  See Global 500—Our Annual Ranking of 
the World’s Largest Corporations, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2012), 
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 if Sovereign (a foreign fund) had acquired an additional 0.1% (i.e., 
15%) of SKC’s stock, SKC would have been deemed a foreign entity and 
would have lost its voting power on SKT.
147
  Then, the entire business 
group (SK Group) could have virtually collapsed because complex chains 
of intra-shareholding between SKC and SKT could have been destroyed.
148
 
In this “tale of two cities,” Livedoor’s CEO Takafumi Horie was a 
Japanese citizen, whereas Sovereign was a foreign entity.  In Japan, 
however, the presence of a “maverick” such as Horie, who does not follow 
Japanese business custom,
149
 was deemed to be the result of globalization 
(more exactly, Americanization).
150
  In addition, Japanese authorities 
became seriously concerned about more hostile takeover attempts from 
abroad.  For example, Keidanren (a powerful Japanese business lobby) 
called for developing defensive measures to prevent “foreign predators” 
from taking control in Japan.
151
  In response, the Japanese government 
postponed a planned corporate law amendment that would give foreign 
business entities more leeway in M&A transactions.
152
  In Korea, after SK 
Group’s experience, the business community, politicians, and the 
government proposed and considered legitimizing a poison pill in its 
corporate law.
153
  They argued that it was unfair that Korean corporations 
were exposed to hostile takeover battles while foreign entities had full 
defensive measures including the pill.
154
  Thus, an effective defensive 
 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/index.html. 
 146 See Jeongitongsinsaeopjabeob [Telecommunications Business Act] (S. Kor.); 
Jeongitongsinsaeopjabeob Sihaengryeong [Enforcement Decree of the Telecommunications 
Business Act] (S. Kor.). 
 147 See, e.g., Ji, supra note 144. 
 148 See id. 
 149 Before Livedoor’s takeover attempt by Horie, there had been virtually no hostile 
takeovers in Japan.  Many Japanese business and political leaders criticized Horie, since they 
believed that he used an undesirable foreign practice—hostile takeovers—that is inconsistent 
with Japanese sensibilities.  See generally Milhaupt, supra note 115, at 2182. 
 150 “Livedoor’s unsolicited bid . . . marked [a] major departur[e] from the norm in the 
world of Japanese takeovers.  As such, [it] generated a welter of controversy by creating the 
impression that a new brand of ‘American’ capitalism was infiltrating Japan.”  Id. at 2181–
82. 
 151 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 129, at 92. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See, e.g., Jung-a Song, South Korea Considers Use of ‘Poison Pills’, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7ae4b6e-ccf0-11de-a748-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JG1LwdeC; Kim Yeon-hee, Update 2-S: Korea Seeks Poison Pill 
Against Hostile M&A, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/11/09/korea-poisonpill-idUKSEO20200720091109. 
 154 For example, Federation of Korean Industries—a large Korean business lobby—
argued that while the United States and European countries have defensive mechanisms such 
as poison pills, dual-class equity structures, and golden shares, Korea did not have any one 
of those mechanisms.  See Myung-Yong Choi, Jeongyeongryeon Jeokdaejeok M&A 
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device such as a pill was necessary in order to lessen the adverse effects that 
hostile takeovers might bring into the Korean economy.
155
  Those opposed 
to adopting the pill were concerned with protecting the interests of 
shareholders and prospective acquirers.
156
 
V. THE PILL: IS IT COMPATIBLE WITH AN IMPORTING 
JURISDICTION? 
A poison pill should be viewed as only one component of the entire 
Delaware takeover mechanism involving various legal and economic 
infrastructures.  The Delaware pill is valid as long as the complementary 
institutions of legal enforcement in the jurisdiction follow the general 
principles of Delaware takeover jurisprudence.  A problem with the legal 
transplant of a pill is that many jurisdictions outside the United States do 
not have the other components of the Delaware takeover package (such as a 
relatively independent board, an efficient judiciary, and safety valves) that 
should be bundled with the pill. 
A.  The Composition and Nature of the Board 
One of the lynchpins supporting the legality of a poison pill in 
Delaware is the existence of a board with a majority of outsiders, which can 
serve as an independent monitor over management.
157
  In most controlling 
shareholder jurisdictions, there is no similar board. 
1.  Is a U.S. “Independent” Board Truly Independent? 
Under U.S. corporate law, executives—agents of a corporation—are in 
charge of day-to-day management.  Since shareholders are usually widely-
dispersed, they are subject to the collective action problem
158
 and do not 
have the power or incentive to monitor the executives.  In order to rectify 
this managerial agency problem, the concept of an “independent” board 
 
Bangeochaek Sigeup (전경련 “적대적 M&A 방어책 시급”) [Federation of Korean 
Industries: Hostile M&A Defense Mechanisms Are Needed Urgently], Meonitudei 
(머니투데이) MONEY TODAY, (Apr. 26, 2006) (S. Kor.), 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2006042612310644681&outlink=1. 
 155 This view is prevalent in business communities in Korea.  See id. 
 156 For example, critics had a view that minority shareholders’ rights were already 
damaged by controlling shareholders.  The adoption of a poison pill would decrease minority 
shareholders’ welfare more. 
 157 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949–50 (Del. 1985); 
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). 
 158 “Where all investors hold small stakes in the enterprise, no single investor has a strong 
incentive to invest time and money in monitoring management.”  ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & 
SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 371.  This phenomenon is the collective action problem.  
For a more in-depth explanation of the collective action problem, see Bebchuk, supra note 
33. 
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emerged, where directors monitor executives on behalf of shareholders.
159
  
Because this idea has been so popular, directors on the typical U.S. board 
have become less associated with corporate insiders.  While most public 
corporations had a majority of inside directors in the 1960s,
160
 in 1999 the 




However, there remains a recurring problem: outside directors are not 
necessarily “independent.”  Even in the United States, which many 
commentators have lauded as the jurisdiction of the best corporate 
governance, a so-called “independent” board can be easily abused as a 
rubber stamp for CEOs and other top executives.  For example, in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom,
162
 the Trans Union board was found to have breached the duty 
of care because the board approved its CEO’s decision to sell the 
corporation blindly without gathering the necessary information.
163
  An 
intriguing feature in Van Gorkom is that four out of five “independent” 
directors were the chief executives of major corporations.
164
  Arguably, they 
might have been too sympathetic to a retiring CEO and might have agreed 
with him on the acquisition issue without seeking enough information.  




 159 One of the most dramatic changes in the U.S. corporate governance since the second 
half of the twentieth century is the emergence of a monitoring board (rather than an advisory 
board) with a majority of “independent” directors.  Gordon, supra note 104, at 1518. 
 160 Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 881. 
 161 Id. at 882. 
 162 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  Van Gorkom is a very controversial case; the decision was 
3–2, an unusually close call for the Delaware Supreme Court. 
 163 The case emphasizes the significance of the decision-making process in a boardroom.  
But, on the other hand, Van Gorkom is criticized as “one of the worst decisions in the history 
of corporate law . . . .”  Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union 
Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985).  Another insightful article on Van Gorkom is 
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of 
Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny 
as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002). 
 164 Among ten directors who served on the Trans Union Board, five were insiders and the 
other five were outsiders.  “Of the outside directors, four were [CEOs] and one was the 
former Dean of the University of Chicago Business School.”  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868. 
 165 See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).  In 
Oracle, the Delaware Chancery Court determined the independence of the special litigation 
committee (SLC) of Oracle, which was set up in response to a derivative action that alleged 
illegal insider trading by Oracle’s directors and officers.  Id. at 921–23.  The court found that 
the members of the SLC, both of whom were professors at Stanford University, and the 
directors who were accused of insider trading were connected via the network of Stanford, 
compromising the SLC’s independence.  Id. at 929–30.  One accused director taught one of 
the SLC members at Stanford while the two other accused directors made significant 
contributions and donations to Stanford.  Id. at 931–35; see also EISENBERG, supra note 38, 
at 980–81. 
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Of course, the economic debacles of Enron and WorldCom raised many 
questions on the independence of U.S. outside directors.
166
  For instance, 
among fourteen directors of Enron’s board, eleven were independent 
directors at the time of its corporate governance fiasco.
167
 
In sum, the independence of U.S. outside directors is not absolute.  
However, a typical U.S. board is required to have relatively sound 
independence.  Most of all, the legitimacy of defensive devices, including a 
poison pill, is materially enhanced by the independent directors’ review as 
seen in Unocal and Moran.
168
  Therefore, an independent board is almost a 
necessary condition for a pill to be legitimate.  Even Van Gorkom, which 
illustrates the weakness of U.S. “independent” boards, simultaneously 
indicates how much the U.S. judiciary cares about the independency of 
boards.  In addition, in Weinberger, the Delaware court emphasized the 
independence of a committee in self-dealing arrangements between a 
controlling shareholder (a parent) and a subsidiary.
169
  Such constraint of a 
dominant shareholder is rarely observed outside the United States.  The 
Delaware court’s lenient position as to a target company’s reliance on the 
“just say no” pill is at least partially based on the court’s confidence in a 
board’s relative independence and the court’s ability to punish a board if it 
is not sufficiently independent.  Thus, without a relatively functional board, 
the legitimacy of a poison pill in a controlling shareholder regime—if 
imported—would not be well supported. 
2.  With Whom Do Outside Directors Deal in the Controlling Shareholder 
Regime? 
As opposed to the state of affairs in the United States, many boards in 
controlling shareholder jurisdictions are not comprised of a majority of 
outside directors.  Sometimes, there is no outside director at all if the 
 
 166 Discussions with Professor Merritt B. Fox, Professor, Columbia Law School, in 
N.Y.C., N.Y. (discussing corporate law during author’s J.S.D. studies at Columbia Law 
School, 2010–2011). 
 167 Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (2011); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002). 
 168 For example, the Moran court stated: 
In addition, the directors must show that the defensive mechanism was “reasonable 
in relation to the threat posed.”  Moreover, that proof is materially enhanced, as we 
noted in Unocal, where, as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal 
consisted of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the 
foregoing standards. 
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (internal citation omitted). 
 169 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 708–11 (Del. 1983). 
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corporate law and securities regulations do not require their presence.  Even 
if outside directors constitute a majority, the quality of independence of a 
typical board in a controlling shareholder system is likely to be lower than 
in the United States. 
In the first place, outside directors are virtually nominated and elected 
by a dominant shareholder who holds voting control.  Additionally, since 
many outsiders have financial and non-financial incentives to be re-
nominated (and thus reelected), they go along with a controlling 
shareholder’s decisions.  Certainly, a CEO in a typical U.S. corporation 
nominates many outside directors as well.
170
  Nonetheless, a board in a 
controlling shareholder system is subject to more serious structural biases 
due to the inherent characteristics of the ownership structure.  Consider the 
nature of corporate insiders’ power in both jurisdictions.  A typical U.S. 
CEO in a widely-held company can be referred to as a “consul.”171  She is 
the most powerful person in a company, but her tenure is limited.  Under 
this polity, outside directors are a consul’s political “colleagues” (although 
inferior to the consul) and act in the rational anticipation that a CEO will 
step down at some point.  In a hostile takeover situation, a board is on the 
management’s side and rarely welcomes an external enemy, which is 
almost invariably a common threat to the board.  The same board, however, 
is relatively active in disciplining management as to issues that fall outside 
a corporate control contest.  These checks and balances systems operate 
more often when a vast majority of shareholders are discontent with the 
ongoing projects and visions of a company, which are reflected in the stock 
price.
172  Outside (and sometimes even inside) directors challenge a CEO 




In a controlling shareholder jurisdiction, on the other hand, a 
controlling shareholder wields more power because she has her own voting 
rights, unlike a typical U.S. CEO who relies on other people’s voting rights.  
In addition, the tenure of a dominant shareholder is deemed infinite because 
family dynastic succession is widely anticipated.  Put simply, a well-
 
 170 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26, at 655. 
 171 See Sang Yop Kang, Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why 
Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other 27 (2011) 
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation chapter, Columbia University School of Law) (on file with 
Columbia University). 
 172 When shareholders are dissatisfied with management of a corporation, they may be 
willing to sell their shares of the corporation.  As a result, the stock price of the corporation 
would go down. 
 173 “The result of this more demanding standard for CEO performance was, according to 
the Booz Allen study, to shorten average CEO tenure from 9.5 years (1995) to 7.3 years 
(2001) and to shorten the average tenure of fired CEOs from 7.0 years (1995) to 4.6 years 
(2001).”  Gordon, supra note 104, at 1533. 
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functioning system of checks and balances is virtually nonexistent, and a 
dominant shareholder is an “emperor” (rather than a “consul”).174  
Accordingly, outside directors are best described as “retainers” rather than 
“colleagues.”  Since a dominant shareholder is basically a shareholder with 
voting control, her capacity as a controlling shareholder has nothing to do 
with a board’s decision or approval.  In other words, a board is not able to 
fire a dominant shareholder, who can be removed only by the sale of her 
stock in the market.
175
  Thus, an “independent” board, even if there is one, 
is not able to overturn a controlling shareholder’s empire. 
Of course, a controlling shareholder may hold an official position in a 
corporation such as CEO.  A CEO is a corporate “officer,” appointed and 
removable by a board.  In theory, an independent board may be able to fire 
the controlling shareholder CEO.  However, given that a controlling 
shareholder has the power to replace the entire board via her voting power, 
such a revolt is futile.  Interestingly, a dominant shareholder may have 
incentive not to hold any official post in a corporation because having an 
official post such as CEO has little to do with a controlling shareholder’s 
power; a dominant shareholder in a controlled-corporation is powerful not 
because she is a CEO, but because she is a controlling shareholder.  When a 
dominant shareholder holds any official role in a company, she is more 
exposed to legal liabilities.  A controlling shareholder without an official 
title may lose the psychic utility generated from self-esteem and social 
prestige.  However, she can recover it by granting herself an unofficial 
designation such as a chairperson in a corporation (not chair of the board), 
which does not carry legal responsibility but gives a controlling shareholder 
as much psychological satisfaction as the CEO title. 
In response to this problem, authorities in Korea amended its 
Commercial Code to create a provision on the de facto directorship, 
targeting dominant shareholders who do not hold official titles but wield 
full control in business groups.
176
  According to this provision, a person 
could be liable for transactions if she is construed to be a de facto director 
who is able to instruct corporate transactions.  Nonetheless, it is well known 
that this provision is not very practical, since it is difficult to show that a 
controlling shareholder is the person who directs particular orders in 
business transactions behind the scene.   
 
 174 Kang, supra note 171. 
 175 Under these circumstances, outside directors in a controlling shareholder regime are 
less independent than those in the United States.  However, this does not mean that outside 
directors in a controlling shareholder regime are meaningless.  At least a board with outside 
directors in a controlling shareholder regime can work as an advisory board for a controlling 
shareholder. 
 176 Sangbeob [Commercial Act], art. 401-2 (S. Kor.). 
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3.  Reputational Constraints 
It is often argued that a U.S. outside director has reason to oversee 
management more actively since she cares about her reputation.
177
  This 
hypothesis is plausible, though not perfectly convincing, in the United 
States and has gained support in both academia and practice.
178
  However, 
the extra-legal mechanism might not work well in controlling shareholder 
jurisdictions. 
To begin, the mechanism of reputation—in the United States as well as 
in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction—constrains an outside director in 
two opposite ways depending on the “audiences” they face.  On the one 
hand, a director cares about general word-of-mouth in the capital market 
and aims at public investors who seek a higher return by correcting agency 
problems.  On the other hand, the same director is concerned about her 
reputation in another audience group, a business circle. 
The problem is that the feedback from business elites to a director is 
more salient in a controlling shareholder system, in particular the CMS, 
than in the United States because of the very nature of ownership structure.  
A CMS economy is dominated by a handful of large business groups
179
 
(and as a result, a handful of dominant shareholders); therefore, a small 
number of controlling shareholders constitute a monopsony in the labor 
market for outside directors.  Once an outsider is stigmatized as recalcitrant 
toward a controlling shareholder in one business group, her reputation will 
spread rapidly among other controlling shareholders and business groups.  
Given that public investors are powerless vis-à-vis dominant shareholders, 
such an outside director has a high chance of being ostracized by all 
business groups, and in essence, by the entire economy.  As a result, even if 
a board consists of outside directors, a board’s independence could be 
 
 177 “Reputation provides another sort of stick or carrot that could enhance director 
independence.”  Gordon, supra note 104, at 1488. 
 178 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 
VA. L. REV. 733, 753-754 (2007) (“As we and others have repeatedly pointed out, reputation 
is the coin of the realm in the world of business—no director wants to be associated with an 
unsuccessful enterprise, much less suffer the reputational harm associated with a fiduciary 
breach.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 921, 927 (2007) (“For outside directors who care about their reputations, even a small 
risk of legal liability in a world in which there are relatively effective courts and reliable 
auditors, may be enough to keep managers in line.  They may give managers slack, but they 
will not tolerate dishonesty.  They will not sacrifice their own reputations for the sake of a 
golfing buddy.”). 
 179 As to business groups, see generally Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way 
to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1999; Tarun 
Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 
HARV. BUS. REV., July 1997; Kang, supra note 171. 






B.  The Judicial System in a Controlling Shareholder Regime 
The Delaware judicial system has been touted as efficient in dealing 
with corporate governance matters;
181
 it has a highly regarded court, 
specializing in corporate cases (without a jury), and acts expeditiously.
182
  
Delaware judges are experienced and well-versed in business trends, 
substantive corporate law, and litigation.
183
  At the same time, Delaware has 
enjoyed another benefit.  Since Delaware is by far the leading state in terms 
of venue of choice for incorporation, its judiciary experiences a great deal 
of litigation among corporations.  Thus legal doctrines are interpreted in a 
more sophisticated way and the results in similar cases are relatively 
predictable.
184
  In this sense, Delaware has established a valuable judicial 
network.
185
  As a result, Delaware corporations, consumers of the corporate 
law adjudication, are able to make their business transactions proceed in a 
more stable way and avoid “unfair surprises” in potential legal cases. 
In contrast, most controlling shareholder countries probably do not 
have efficient judicial institutions like the Delaware courts.
186
  Most 
importantly, because the market for corporate control has been virtually 
nonexistent in these countries, judiciaries are not able to use precedents of 
their own.  Alternatively, these countries may consult the highly-regarded 
Delaware case law to solve challenging legal problems associated with a 
poison pill.  However, an inherent risk of this stopgap is that Delaware 
takeover doctrine is incompatible if applied without considering key 
differences in underlying circumstances in such foreign countries. 
Judges in many countries rotate periodically and cover various legal 
areas (such as criminal, contract, torts, administrative, and family law) in 
their careers because they need to be familiar with as many cases as 
possible in order to supervise their junior judges when they are promoted to 
higher positions.  Under these circumstances, having expertise in one 
 
 180 It does not mean that outside directors in the controlling shareholder regime are futile.  
Although it is difficult for outside directors to resist a controlling shareholder’s decisions, 
they are able to advise the controlling shareholder.  See supra note 175. 
 181 See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 72 (2000) (“The fact that the Delaware system dominates others does 
not of course mean it is optimal.  But I am willing to assume that it supplies a pretty efficient 
system of legal organization.”). 
 182 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003). 
 183 See id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 For simplicity, this Article rules out the possibility that courts in such countries are 
corrupt, although this is a proper concern in some countries. 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:619 (2013) 
652 
particular area of law (e.g., corporate law) is impractical, because 
judiciaries prefer generalist judges to specialist ones.  In addition, some 
jurisdictions do not require a judge to have any experience as a lawyer.  
Hence, a judge can start her judicial career in her mid-20s without any 
exposure to real business transactions.
187
  Such a system may have merit; 
however, a key disadvantage is that a court is not well-equipped to handle 
complicated business and takeover cases. 
Moreover, timing is often of the essence in business transactions.  
Thus, business people need a judiciary like the Delaware courts that 
expedites cases and quickly resolves uncertainties surrounding transactions.  
Unfortunately, courts in most countries are not fast.  For example, it is not 
uncommon for a typical dispute to be resolved in ten or more years in the 
Indian judiciary, although it shares a common law heritage with its 
counterpart in the United States.
188
  With this delay, even the best statutes 
and case law are not able to meaningfully protect the interests of parties in 
takeover transactions.  Thus, injured parties (e.g., victims of a poison pill) 
are often concerned about whether they should bring suits in the first place. 
C.  Does a Ballot Box Safety Valve Work in a Controlling Shareholder 
Regime? 
As discussed, Delaware corporate law provides a couple safety valves 
to the pill: the protection of the shareholder franchise (Blasius) and a 
board’s duty to act as auctioneer in certain circumstances (Revlon).189  
These two safety valves support the legality of the poison pill.  When the 
poison pill is introduced in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction’s corporate 
law, these safety valves will most likely fail to work properly. 
1.  Delaware Does Not Allow “Just Say Never”190 
The court in Time noted that a target board can just say no to a hostile 
bid by flatly refusing to redeem a poison pill.
191
  However, the shareholders 
have recourse in the face of a board with the “just say no” pill—they are 
able to replace the directors in a proxy contest so that new directors will 
redeem the pill.
192
  In this sense, even the “just say no” pill is not really 
invincible as long as the voting mechanism is preserved to reflect the real 
 
 187 For example, East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and China adopt this career 
judge system. 
 188 John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: the Case of India, 43 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 491, 510 (2009). 
 189 See Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 245. 
 190 Professor Marcel Kahan coined the phrase “just say never.”  Gordon, supra note 76, at 
522 n.40. 
 191 For a more in-depth explanation of “just say no,” see id. at 522–31. 
 192 See id. at 523. 
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intent of all shareholders.  However, target boards have made attempts to 
block shareholders’ recourse to the ballot by inventing mutants of a 
standard poison pill, such as a “dead hand provision.”193  In such a 
provision, only the incumbent directors or their designated successors were 
entitled to redeem a pill.
194
  In Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.,
195
 the court 
explained that “it would make little sense for shareholders or the hostile 
bidder to wage a proxy contest to replace the incumbent board”196 since 
even a newly elected board in favor of the deal would be precluded from 
redeeming the pill.
197
  Explaining that the provision effectively 
disenfranchised shareholders who wished to elect a board committed to 
redeeming the pill,
198
 the Toll Brothers court invalidated the dead hand 
provision.  In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, the “slow hand 
pill,” another variation of the standard pill that is non-redeemable for six 
months after a change in board control, was invalidated as well.
199
 
The “just say no” defense is equivalent to the “just say wait” 
defense.
200
  The Delaware jurisprudence approved the “just say no” defense, 
through which a board can buy time to persuade shareholders to agree on an 
incumbent’s business strategy.201  A board that pursues airtight protection 
would like to thwart a proxy fight to redeem a poison pill.  This strategy is 
the “just say never” defense, which is stronger than the “just say no” 
defense.
202
  However, a board in Delaware is not allowed to use the “just 
say never” pill, which makes the ballot box safety valve (associated with 
Blasius) powerless by tainting the shareholder referendum on a corporate 
control issue. 
 
 193 As to a “dead hand provision,” see Carmody v. Toll Bros, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184 
(Del. Ch. 1998). 
 194 Jacobs, supra note 32, at 348. 
 195 As for Toll Brothers, Professor Bainbridge explains, “In addition to fairly standard 
flip-in and flip-over features, the Toll Brothers pill provided that it could be redeemed only 
by those directors who had been in office when the shareholder rights constituting the pill 
had become exercisable (or their approved successors).”  Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 
29 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2003). 
 196 Toll Brothers, 723 A.2d at 1187; see also Bainbridge, supra note 195, at 17 (“[The 
dead hand] provision was intended to close the proxy contest/redemption loophole in 
standard poison pills by precluding newly elected directors from redeeming the pill.”). 
 197 Bainbridge, supra note 195, at 17. 
 198 See id. 
 199 Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 200 As Professors Kahan and Rock explain, “Thus, the ultimate effect of the pill is akin to 
‘just say wait’: it leaves the decision on whether to accept a bid to the outside board 
members, but only until shareholders can replace the board, and in the meantime discourages 
defensive board actions.”  Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 910. 
 201 Id. at 909–11. 
 202 As for the “just say never” defense, see generally Gordon, supra note 76. 
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2.  The CMS with a Pill: “Double Discrimination” against a Hostile Bidder 
It is then fair to ask whether a controlling shareholder regime—the 
CMS in particular—preserves the ballot box safety valve.  To begin, 
interference with the shareholder franchise is an innate problem of the CMS 
ownership structure since the very definition of the CMS assumes that a 
dominant shareholder is able to distort the voting mechanism.
203
  Suppose 
that a dominant shareholder holds a small fraction of a corporation’s 
economic interest (e.g., 5%) while exercising a large stake of voting rights 
(e.g., 40%) through stock pyramiding, dual class common stocks, and intra-
shareholding.
204
  In the takeover context, such voting leverage mechanisms 
are in themselves strong defensive devices to a CMS dominant shareholder, 
even in the absence of a poison pill.  As discussed, this is exactly the reason 
why Germany opposed the European Takeover Directive in June 2000.
205
 
Therefore, if the “just say no” pill is allowed in a CMS jurisdiction, a 
dominant shareholder would be excessively protected from hostile 
takeovers under a “double discrimination” mechanism against a hostile 
bidder.  The first discrimination takes place between a dominant 
shareholder and the rest of the shareholders (including a hostile bidder); it is 
based on the inflation of a dominant shareholder’s voting rights legalized by 
the CMS.  As a result, the voting power of the remaining shareholders 
(including a hostile bidder) is deflated.  The second discrimination takes 
place between a hostile bidder and the other shareholders (including a 
controlling shareholder); it is based on the dilution of the hostile bidder’s 
economic interest and voting rights generated by the poison pill.  
Accordingly, other shareholders (including a controlling shareholder) will 
benefit.  As a result of the accumulation of “double discrimination” 
imposed by both the CMS and a pill, a hostile bidder’s likelihood of 
winning a takeover battle is substantially reduced. 
3.  Can a Prospective Acquirer Overcome the CMS with a Pill? 
In Delaware, boards are permitted to indefinitely maintain the pill to 
block a bid, while shareholders are protected from managerial moves to 
impede their voting against incumbent management.
206
  In that sense, the 
conflicting interests between management’s autonomy and shareholders’ 
fundamental right to vote are relatively balanced.  When the Delaware pill 
is imported to a jurisdiction with the CMS, however, this balance is no 
 
 203 As for the problem of voting distortion, see generally Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, 
supra note 125. 
 204 As for voting leverage mechanisms such as stock pyramiding, dual class common 
stocks, and intra-shareholding, see id. 
 205 See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 129, at 80–81. 
 206 See Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 25, at 907. 
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longer maintained due to the very definition of the CMS. 
Table 1, below, provides a numerical example.
207
  Suppose that a 
prospective acquirer considers two companies as takeover targets: one is a 
CMS firm (Company CMS) and the other is a widely-held firm (Company 
WH).  Both have pills that would be triggered when an uninvited bidder 
acquires 20% of their shares.  A dominant shareholder in Company CMS 
holds 5% of the common stock of Company CMS.  Likewise, a 
management team in Company WH holds 5% of the common stock of 
Company WH.  In terms of voting power, however, the dominant 
shareholder of Company CMS exercises 40% via voting leverage, while 
management in Company WH holds 5% voting rights commensurate to its 
cash-flow rights. 
At first, it seems that a prospective acquirer may purchase up to 19.9% 
of the shares of each company before the poison pills are triggered.  In fact, 
however, the acquisition of 19.9% of the shares of Company CMS is far 
more difficult than the acquisition of 19.9% of the shares of Company WH.  
As to Company WH’s stock, a prospective acquirer may purchase 19.9% of 
the shares out of the 95% free float in a widely-held company (excluding 
5% that management owns).  The effective percentage of shares that a 
prospective acquirer should purchase is 20.94% of all available shares, 
which is 19.9% of the 95% free float.  In contrast, regarding Company 
CMS’s stock, she must buy 19.9% of all shares out of the 60% public float 
(excluding the 40% of votes that the controlling shareholder holds).  The 
effective percentage of shares that she must purchase is 33.16% of all 
available shares, which is 19.9% out of the 60% free float. 
Even if a hostile bidder could acquire 19.9% of the shares of each 
company, she would need to overcome other difficulties related to proxy 
contests at each company so that her director candidates will redeem the 
pill.  Again, waging a proxy contest in Company CMS is far more difficult 
than in Company WH.  In Company CMS, in order to obtain control (i.e., 
50.1%), the prospective acquirer has to have the support of 30.2%
208
 of the 
shares out of the remaining 40.1%.
209
  The effective percentage of votes that 
she needs from the rest of the shareholders is 75.3%, which is 30.2% out of 
40.1%.  In contrast, for Company WH, a prospective acquirer has to gain 
 
 207 For the purpose of simplification, this Article assumes that in Company CMS, a CMS 
controlling shareholder has multiple voting shares while a prospective acquirer can only 
obtain one-share-one-vote stock.  In Company WH, the one-share-one-vote rule is equally 
preserved among all shareholders, including management. 
 208 Since the bidder currently has 19.9% of votes, she needs 30.2% more in order to gain 
a majority of votes. 
 209 100% – 19.9% (the acquirer’s fraction) – 40% (the controlling shareholder’s fraction) 
= 40.1% 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:619 (2013) 
656 
30.2% of the votes from shareholders out of the remaining 75.1%.
210
  Here, 
the effective percentage of additional votes that she needs is 40.2%, which 
is 30.2% out of 75.1%.  Since management has the advantage in waging a 
proxy contest,
211
 the 40.2% hurdle is demanding to a prospective acquirer.  
However, a prospective acquirer still has a chance at success.  On the other 
hand, the 75.3% bar is extremely high to a challenger, so it is almost 
impossible for a prospective acquirer to gain control of Company CMS.  In 
sum, a bidder in a CMS jurisdiction (compared to a bidder in a dispersed 
shareholder jurisdiction) faces two more difficult obstacles with respect to a 
poison pill: one in purchasing shares in the market and the other in 








Corporate Insider’s Cash Flow Rights 
(%) 
5 5 
Corporate Insider’s Voting Rights 
(%) 
40 5 
Public Float (%) 60 95 
Effective Percentage of Shares an 
Acquirer Should Purchase When She 
Purchases 19.9 % 
19.9 / 60 = 33.16 % 19.9 / 95 = 20.94 % 
Effective Percentage of Votes from 
the Rest of Shareholders that an 
Acquirer Needs for a Majority 
30.2 / 40.1 = 75.3 % 30.2 / 75.1 = 40.2 % 
4.  The CMS with a Pill: In Between “Just Say No” and “Just Say Never” 
Consider another perspective on the relative strength of the CMS pill.  
Suppose that there is a straight horizontal line that describes the degree of 
deterrence created by a defensive device.  As illustrated in Figure 1 below, 
the scale starts from the left and increases to the right.
212
  Initially, consider 
three different types of poison pills such as the Interco pill, Time pill (“just 
say no”), and Toll Brothers pill (“just say never”).  The reference point is 
 
 210 100% – 19.9% (the acquirer’s fraction) – 5% (management’s fraction) = 75.1% 
 211 See Bebchuk, supra note 33. 
 212 Thus, the end of the left side represents a defense device with the least deterrence 
effect, and the end of the right side represents a defense device with the most deterrence 
effect. 
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the “just say no” pill213 upheld in Time.  In Time, while a board is able to 
refuse to redeem a pill, the board is subject to a limit—the pill would be 
redeemed if a challenger wins a proxy contest.  In this sense, the Interco pill 
is weaker than the “just say no” pill in terms of deterrence power.  As 
explained,
214
 under the Interco pill, a board is required to redeem a pill 
when it faces a non-coercive bid; thus, the board does not have the option of 
flatly refusing an outside bid.  On the other hand, the “just say never” pill, 
such as a dead-hand provision in Toll Brothers, is stronger than the “just 
say no” pill.  Under the “just say never” pill,215 even shareholder franchise 
is futile; redeeming such a pill is not a viable option to a challenger even if 
she wins a proxy contest.  Therefore, in Figure 1, on the far left side is the 
Interco pill, which marks the weakest deterrence power to a hostile bid.
216
  
On the far right side is the “just say never” pill, which marks the strongest 
deterrence power.  The “just say no” pill is situated in the middle of these 
two points. 
However, if a Time pill is coupled with another strong defensive 
device, such a combination is located further to the right on the scale.  For 
example, the combination of “just say no” and an ESB carries a far stronger 
deterrent effect than that of a standalone “just say no” pill.217  Similarly, the 
CMS ownership with a pill increases the deterrent power of the standalone 
“just say no” pill so that it is located in the middle of “just say no” and “just 
say never.”  In sum, the deterrent power of each defensive measure is 
roughly situated in the following order from weakest to strongest: the 
Interco pill, the Time pill (just say no), the Time pill plus either an ESB or a 












 213 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 214 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 215 See supra notes 193–199 and accompanying text. 
 216 In Figure 1, the Interco pill marks the weakest deterrence power to a hostile bid.  It 
does not mean that the Interco pill is the weakest among all pills.  It only means that the 
Interco pill is weakest among the six pills explained in Figure 1. 
 217 As to the deterrent effect of the “just say no” pill with an ESB, see Bebchuk, Coates 
IV & Subramanian, supra note 25. 
 218 In the interest of simplicity, this Article assumes that the combination of a pill and a 
CMS and the combination of a pill and an ESB are situated at the same point in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Deterrence Power of Various Pills 
 
5.  The CMS with a Pill: Could It Damage Blasius? 
As Chancellor Allen famously stated in Blasius, “[t]he shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests.”219  Therefore, even if Delaware courts are highly 
deferential to a board (and management) and do not second-guess business 
judgments made by a board,
220
 they are more intrusive when the primary 
purpose of a board’s conduct is to interfere with the shareholder 
franchise.
221
  As to the inquiry of whether using a combination of a pill and 
an ESB amounts to undermining the shareholder franchise, reasonable 
minds can disagree.  Nonetheless, it is true that the board with such a 
combination can more easily abuse its discretionary power in order to 
perpetuate itself.  In that sense, a pill—usually the “just say no” pill upheld 
in Delaware—with an ESB is less likely to be consistent with the tenet of 
Blasius, but it is not definitely inconsistent with Blasius. 
When a jurisdiction allows the CMS, a combination of an imported pill 
from the United States (Delaware) and the CMS will generate consequences 
similar to a combination of a Delaware pill and an ESB.  This is because the 
built-in nature of the CMS, which provides a controlling shareholder with 
multiple votes, distorts the shareholder referendum.  In principle, an 
original Delaware pill would be legally upheld by the possibility that 
shareholders can indirectly redeem it by replacing a board.  Accordingly, 
the legal legitimacy of the combination of a pill and the CMS is 
questionable since the ballot box safety valve is tainted by the very nature 
of the CMS where the values of shareholders’ votes are not equal among 
shareholders.  To make matters worse, a dominant shareholder in a CMS 
may implement a staggered board in addition to a pill.  This combination of 
defensive tactics—Delaware’s “just say no” pill, a CMS, and a staggered 
board—would be what this Article calls a “three-headed dragon,” which is 
more inclusive and powerful than the combination of the “just say no” pill 
 
 219 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 220 As to the business judgment rule, see supra notes 53–54. 
 221 See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660. 
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and a staggered board.
222
 
In sum, when the Delaware pill is adopted in a controlling shareholder 
jurisdiction, the transplanted “just say no” pill would be transformed into 
the more invincible “three-headed dragon” pill, which could be as powerful 
as the “just say never” pill.  Therefore, once a pill is allowed in this 
jurisdiction without careful assessment of the accumulative effect caused by 
the CMS and an ESB, the market for corporate control will be almost 
entirely stifled by the de facto “just say never” pill, which is invalid in the 
United States.  Indeed, the “three-headed dragon” pill could make the 
shareholder franchise system (thus, the tenet of Blasius) futile.  The updated 
deterrent power of each defensive measure is roughly situated in the 
following order, from weakest to strongest: the Interco pill, the Time pill 
(“just say no”), the Time pill plus either an ESB or a CMS, and the “three-
headed dragon” pill or the Toll Brothers pill (“just say never”).223 
6.  Defensive Measures and Proportionality 
As explained, adopting Delaware’s “just say no” pill blindly leads to 
too much deterrence against hostile takeovers in a jurisdiction.  However, it 
is noteworthy that a poison pill is the most powerful anti-takeover defensive 
device.  In other words, without the pill, the importing jurisdiction’s present 
defense system may generate too little deterrence compared to other 
jurisdictions that allow the pill.  In this sense, it does not follow that any 
additional defensive measure is unnecessary or harmful to a controlling 
shareholder jurisdiction.  If the jurisdiction needs new defensive measures, 
it should carefully review whether the combined effect of newly adopted 
and existing defensive measures would be proportional to hostile takeover 
threats from outsiders under the current climate and institutions.  For 
example, as a less powerful anti-takeover device, the Interco pill may be 
considered. 
In addition, it seems that a CMS based on intra-shareholding is a 
relatively weak ownership structure compared to a structure based on either 
stock-pyramiding or dual class common stocks.  As seen in the SK Group 
episode, if a hostile bidder is able to find a weak intra-shareholding chain 
within a business group, the entire group’s control structure could collapse.  
 
 222 In terms of the deterrence power to a hostile bid, the “three-headed dragon” pill is 
stronger than the combination of the “just say no” pill and an ESB since the “three-headed 
dragon” pill includes the CMS feature in addition to the “just say no” pill and an ESB. 
 223 In terms of the deterrence power to a hostile bid, the “three-headed dragon” pill and 
the “just say never” pill are stronger than the “just say no” pill.  Between the “three-headed 
pill” and the “just say never” pill, however, it is difficult to generalize which one is stronger 
than which.  In the interest of simplicity, this Article assumes that the “three-headed dragon” 
pill and the “just say never” pill have the same degree of deterrence power to a hostile bid.  
Thus, the two pills are situated at the same point in Figure 1. 
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This reality should be taken into account in determining the proportionality 
of an anti-takeover legal system in a jurisdiction that considers importing a 
defense measure. 
D.  Would Revlon Protect Non-controlling Shareholders in a Controlling 
Shareholder Regime? 
In addition to the ballot box safety valve based on Blasius, another 
safety valve to the “just say no” defense is a target board’s Revlon duty.224  
According to Revlon, when a corporation enters into the Revlon mode—sale 
of a corporation, changes in long-term strategy in the face of a bid, or 
fundamental change of control—the board should act as a neutral auctioneer 
among bidders rather than as a corporate defender.
225
  Therefore, the board 
is not able to flatly refuse a bid enhancing shareholder wealth.  If a 
controlling shareholder jurisdiction imports the Revlon duty when it adopts 
the pill in its legal system, non-controlling shareholders could be more 
protected, at least when a controlling shareholder incurs the Revlon duty. 
In developing countries, however, there are limitations of Revlon’s 
application to the controlling shareholder regime.  Consider two types of 
controlling shareholders in developing countries.
226
  Some controlling 
shareholders expropriate substantially all corporate value at the expense of 
non-controlling shareholders through a one-time transaction, just as a 
government imposes prohibitive taxes on its people.
227
  Such controlling 
shareholders will leave corporations as shells, since the corporation has 
nothing left to take.
228
  Essentially, they are “roving controlling 
shareholders.”229  In contrast, other controlling shareholders extract from 
non-controlling shareholders based on a long-term plan.
230
  They transfer a 
fraction of corporate value through periodic, ongoing transactions, just like 
a rational government levies sustainable taxes on its people.
231
  
Accordingly, such controlling shareholders will stay within corporations for 
 
 224 See Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 245–46. 
 225 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 226 As for two types of controlling shareholders in developing countries, see Sang Yop 
Kang, Controlling Shareholders—Roving or Stationary (2011) (unpublished J.S.D. 
dissertation chapter, Columbia University School of Law) (on file with Columbia 
University).  Professor Mancur Olson coined the terms “roving bandits” and “stationary 
bandits” to explain the evolution of a political system.  Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, 
Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993).  Olson’s logic of political 
economy is reinterpreted in the context of corporate governance scholarship in Kang’s 
article. 
 227 See generally Kang, supra note 226. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
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a long time (mostly, they rely on family succession).
232
  In this sense, they 
are “stationary controlling shareholders.”233 
A roving controlling shareholder regime is the worst ownership system 
in terms of investor protection, since inefficient enforcement allows 
controlling shareholders to pillage corporate assets although the laws 
declare protection of non-controlling shareholders.
234
  Suppose that a 
jurisdiction dominated by roving controlling shareholders imports 
Delaware’s poison pill and doctrines, including Revlon.  In that case, roving 
controlling shareholders will place the poison pill in corporations when they 
need it.  In theory, the Revlon duty should be implemented in the 
jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, in a world dominated by powerful roving 
controlling shareholders, the duty exists only as law-on-the-books and 
would rarely be enforced by the authorities.
235
  In sum, dominant 
shareholders would cherry pick corporate laws, using their right (i.e., a 
poison pill) without honoring their obligation (i.e., Revlon duty), which in 
principle should be bundled with the right. 
In a jurisdiction with a vast majority of “stationary controlling 
shareholders,” the Revlon duty is also likely to be inapplicable.  Cherry 
picking might be one reason.  Another reason derives from the very nature 
of a stationary controlling shareholder.  Usually, a stationary controlling 
shareholder is by definition a family controlling shareholder who is going to 
stay in a company infinitely through family succession.
236
  Revlon, 
however, postulates an “end-game” situation where a target is to be put up 
for sale, to break-up, or to go through a change of control in an M&A 
market.
237
  Thus, the Revlon mode would rarely be triggered by a family 
 
 232 Id. 
 233 Kang, supra note 226. 
 234 Id. In such a jurisdiction, government agencies often collude with business tycoons, 
and even courts may acquiesce to, or ignore, suspicious transactions by corporate insiders. 
 235 Corporate governance fiascos in Russia are exemplary.  During the late 1990s, 
corporations in Russia had serious corporate governance problems such as diverting 
corporate assets by managers or controlling shareholders.  “A 51% shareholding interest in a 
Russian company conveys to the owner a license to steal from the remaining 49%.”  
Editorial, Investor Hell, J. COM., June 15, 1998, at 6A.  In Russia, allegedly, some local 
governments were actively involved in corporate scandals: “Supported by the local 
government, the manager installed Cossack guards, held his own shareholder meetings, 
locked out the owners, diluted the owners’ stock, and ignored dozens of court rulings against 
him over the years.”  Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons 
from Russian Enterprises Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1742 (2000) (citing Mark 
Whitehouse, Germans Cry Foul in Gypsum Plant Feud, MOSCOW TIMES, Nov. 29, 1997; 
Mark Whitehouse, Under Siege, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997). 
 236 See generally Kang, supra note 226.  A controlling shareholder has an infinite time 
horizon through family succession.  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in 
Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 643 (2007). 
 237 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. 
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controlling shareholder since she plays in a “repeated game.”  Put simply, a 
stationary family corporation is not likely to be put up for sale, to break-up, 
or to go through a change of control in an M&A market.  In that sense, the 
Revlon principle would be only a decoration in the legal system, even if it is 
enforceable.  Even in the United States, reliance on Revlon is not very 
conducive to a prospective acquirer and shareholders who oppose 
management’s refusal of an outside bid. 
E.  Summary: Transplanted Pill in a Big Picture 
It is clear that a poison pill should not be treated as an isolated aspect 
of the Delaware takeover law system.  Accordingly, the legality of a poison 
pill should be supported in the context of other legal and socio-economic 
institutions such as: (1) a relatively well-functioning independent board, (2) 
an efficient judiciary and enforcement mechanism, (3) the ballot box safety 
valves (based on Blasius and Revlon), and (4) investor protection.  
Sometimes these institutions do not work well, even in the United States.  
They would probably be less efficient in a controlling shareholder 
regime.
238
  Without efficient institutions, the legitimacy of an imported 
poison pill from the United States, particularly the “just say no” pill, would 
be questionable in controlling shareholder jurisdictions. 
VI. THE POISON PILL, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, AND THE 
SALE OF CONTROL 
In the United States, the evolution of executive compensation since the 
1990s has transformed the pill from an entrenchment device to a negotiation 
tool, at least to some degree.  For this reason, the market for corporate 
control has still survived despite the pill’s strong deterrent effect against a 
hostile bid.  Even if the pill is incorporated in the legal system of a 
controlling shareholder jurisdiction, it is difficult to expect the same 
phenomenon. 
A.  Severance Pay and Friendly Deals 
In 1991, the average large firm CEO in the United States made 140 
times of what the average worker made.
239
  By 2003, this increased to over 
 
L. REV. 1189, 1203–04 (2002). 
 238 In Part VI, this Article argues that without economic incentive devices that 
compensate existing corporate insiders, the “just say no” pill is likely to be abused as an 
entrenchment tool. 
 239 Stephan M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX L. REV. 
1615, 1619 n.16 (2004) (citing CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 
2004, at 61). 





  In contrast, the average CEO-employee compensation ratio is 
not that high outside the United States.  For example, the average Japanese 
CEO makes sixteen times the pay of an average Japanese industrial worker 
and the average German CEO makes about twenty-one times the pay of the 
average German factory worker.
241
  Perhaps one reason for such a sharp 
distinction is the different cultural norms in each jurisdiction.  For example, 
in countries that place a higher value on social democracy and 




The hostile deals that once brought controversy and fear to Corporate 
America in the 1980s suddenly quieted down as the pill was legalized and 
firmly established in the Delaware takeover system.
243
  However, the 
evolution of U.S. executive compensation made market participants adapt 
to the new takeover environment.  For example, a generous severance 
package corresponding with large executive compensation might 
incentivize incumbent management to leave a company when an outside bid 
for acquisition is offered.
244
  Therefore, friendly M&A activities filled the 
vacuum left by hostile deals stifled by the pill.  With the evolution of 
executive compensation, the pill was repurposed as a negotiation leverage 
tool enhancing the welfare of shareholders.  However, many commentators 




 240 Id. 
 241 EISENBERG, supra note 38, at 649.  Professor Eisenberg relied on GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, 
IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 206–209 (1991).  It is noteworthy that Crystal’s work was written in 
1991.  As mentioned above, the U.S. CEO–employee compensation multiple was about 500 
in 2003.  In that sense, it would be fair to compare 2003 U.S. data and 2003 data from 
Germany, Japan, or other countries.  At this moment, however, the author of this Article 
does not have credible data available to compare the compensation disparity in the United 
States and other countries in the same recent year.  In addition, the point of this Article is to 
show that there is a huge gap between the United States and other countries in terms of 
executive compensation rather than to show the exact difference of each jurisdiction’s 
executive compensation level.  For this purpose, Crystal’s 1991 work, which was quoted by 
Professor Eisenberg (2005), is still valid. 
 242 Whether U.S. executive compensation is “exorbitant” in absolute and comparative 
terms is an interesting and worthwhile topic to analyze, but it is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Rather, the focus here is on how such a sharp contrast between the level of 
executive compensation in the United States and that of other countries can affect incentives 
of corporate insiders with pills when they are approached by control-changing bids. 
 243 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Paramount 
Commc’ns v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 244 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 892 n.99 (“For example, both greater use of stock 
options and greater restrictions on takeover defenses make it more likely that an unsolicited 
bid will be consummated, but managers are likely to favor the former over the latter.”). 
 245 For example, “If all the proffered justifications for allowing target management to 
‘just say no’ do not withstand analysis, then what is the real explanation?  The short answer, 
I think, is management entrenchment.”  Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE 
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Suppose that a pill is placed in the corporate law system in a 
jurisdiction with a low compensation ratio between the CEO and a rank-
and-file employee.  It is less likely that such a jurisdiction has a practice of 
offering generous severance packages to departing corporate insiders.  
Thus, corporate insiders have little reason to accept hostile bids that deprive 
them of jobs, pecuniary benefits, and psychic utility without any 
compensation for such losses.  Accordingly, they will use the pill in order to 
quell friendly deals as well as hostile takeovers. 
One may argue that such a jurisdiction is able to develop an executive 
compensation system just as the United States did in 1990s; the U.S. CEO-
employee compensation multiple increased from 140 to 500 (a 257% 
increase),
246
 and market participants learned how to live with a pill by 
designing severance packages with more generous terms.
247
  Of course, 
some countries can dramatically change their pay tradition as a pill is 
instated in their takeover laws.  However, in many countries, the differences 
in culture, traditional values, political arrangements, and understanding of 
capitalism would make it difficult to accept the practice of Anglo-American 
executive compensation based on a large income disparity.  Consider these 
differences from real episodes in the United States, Germany, and Korea. 
Michael Ovitz—then CEO of Walt Disney Company—was a central 
figure in one of the most important executive compensation cases in the 
United States.
248
  He did not perform well, and his termination was 
discussed among the board.  Finally, he left Disney and received 
approximately $140 million in the form of severance pay after just about 
one year in Disney.
249
  Another example of “pay without performance”250 in 
severance pay can be taken from the finance industry.  When Stanley 
 
FOREST L. REV. 121, 127 (1990).  “The emergence of shareholder activism in the early 
1990s, combined with important changes in the Delaware case law around the same time,
 
made institutional investors acutely aware of the potential for managerial entrenchment 
behind [a staggered board]/pill combination.”  Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian, supra 
note 25, at 900. 
 246 [(500 / 140) – 1] x 100% = 257%. 
 247 As for market participants’ adjustment to Delaware takeover law with a poison pill, 
see Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 896, 898 (“Such compensation devices provide 
substantial incentives to managers to accept an unsolicited takeover bid . . . . Shareholders, 
then, do not love the pill, but they have learned to live with the pill.”). 
 248 There are a series of cases in relation to Walt Disney Company’s executive 
compensation.  See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 
(Del. Ch. 2003). 
 249 Id. at 279. 
 250 The expression “pay without performance” is borrowed from the title of a book 
written by two corporate law professors.  LUCIAN BEBCHUK AND JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006).  The two 
authors explained problems of American executive compensation practice in another article 
as well.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26. 
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O’Neal was ousted from Merrill Lynch for his disappointing performance 
in 2007, he departed with $161.5 million.
251
  Likewise, it is not uncommon 
that underperforming top executives in the United States can “exit 
gracefully” with generous severance pay.  They are even applauded and 
touted as “good men” at the time of control change because they voluntarily 
step down from their corporate positions and accept a value-enhancing 
merger or acquisition.  In addition, they are often able to reap a substantial 
profit from equity-based compensation when high-premium bids are 
offered.  This is an interesting phenomenon because these departing 
executives may be the reason for their companies’ depressed stock prices, 
and high bid prices are actually the level of prices that stocks should be 
worth with management of average capability. 
Outside the United States, however, this generous severance pay is 
rare.  In Germany, Vodafone, a British telecommunications firm, acquired 
Mannesmann, a German conglomerate, in 2000.
252
  Although the agreement 
was ultimately friendly, Vodafone initiated a hostile bid at first.  This deal 
brought sensation in Europe since it was the first “hostile” takeover (in 
terms of the nature of the first bid) of a German firm by a foreign firm.
253
  
One controversy surrounding this deal was an “appreciation award” granted 
to Klaus Esser (then chief executive) and other managers of 
Mannesmann
254—in particular, Esser was granted ₤10 million (about €15 
million).  Initially Esser had fought the Vodafone bid, but he suddenly 
“gave up resistance against Vodafone the day he knew about his 
compensation package.”255 
In the United States, the question of executive compensation is 
generally left to the board of directors’ business judgment.256  Accordingly, 
even if some disgruntled shareholders bring lawsuits for monetary damages, 
it is difficult to find that corporate insiders breach any fiduciary duty.  
Surprisingly, to those who are accustomed to the “global” executive 
compensation standard (which is actually the American standard), Esser and 
key players designing the appreciation award were criminally prosecuted on 
 
 251 See Miles Weiss, Merrill Lynch’s O’Neal Departs With $161.5 Million, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 30, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a52OIGkiBx0Q. 
 252 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 129, at 69. 
 253 See Fallout from Mannesmann: Breach of Trust?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 2003), 
http://www.economist.com.hk/node/1596006 [hereinafter Fallout]. 
 254 Id.; see also MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 129, at 70. 
 255 See Fallout, supra note 253 (quoting Martin Peltzer, a lawyer in Frankfurt). 
 256 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 129, at 72 (“[U]nlike U.S. corporate law, which is 
largely silent on the question of executive compensation and leaves it to the business 
judgment of the board of directors, German statutory law sets the outer limits of 
compensation packages.”). 
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the grounds of breach of trust.
257
  Fortune magazine vividly described the 
Mannesmann case in an article titled “In Germany, High Pay Is a Crime.”258  
However, BGH (Bundesgerichtshof, the Federal Court of Justice in 
Germany) reversed the trial court’s decision.259  Finally, the retrial court 
terminated the criminal trial on the condition that the accused pay a total of 
€5.8 million to various public-interest organizations.260 
Another example of a top executive’s severance pay being tried in a 
criminal court came in Korea.
261
  During the aftermath of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, many Korean companies with liquidity problems 
were sold to foreign investors at deeply discounted prices.  In 2003, Lone 
Star acquired a controlling stake (51%) in Korea Exchange Bank (KEB),
262
 
which was one of the largest national banks in Korea.  However, the 
prosecutor’s office in Korea accused Lee Kang-Won, then chief executive 
of KEB, of intentionally making KEB’s financial condition look worse than 
it was in order to facilitate the friendly deal.
263
  Allegedly, Lee received 
$1.5 million for his future services in the bank as a consultant, which could 
be construed as compensation for smoothing the deal.  After enduring five 
years of hardship under criminal investigation and trial, Lee was found not 
guilty of the charge of dereliction of duty by selling KEB at an intentionally 
low price.
264
  Although Lee was chief executive of one of the largest banks 
in Korea—a relatively large economy in the world265—generous severance 
 
 257 For details on this criminal trial, see id. at 69–74. 
 258 Id. at 71 (quoting In Germany, High Pay Is a Crime, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 2003). 
 259 Id. at 73. 
 260 Id. at 74.  In particular Esser, who received €15 million, was required to pay €1.5 
million.  Id. 
 261 See generally Sung-Hyun Kim, ‘Lone Star Sageon’ Onyeonmane ‘Mujoe’ Jongjibu 
(‘론스타 사건’ 5년 만에 ‘무죄’ 종지부) [Lone Star Case – Not Guilty in 5 Years], 
MEONITUDEI (머니투데이) [MONEY TODAY] (Oct. 14, 2010) (S. Kor.), 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2010101415392042484&outlink=1; 
Jung-a Song, Prosecutors Call Sale to Lone Star ‘Illegal’, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2006), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1fc0ac50-85a2-11db-b12c-
0000779e2340.html#axzz2YR1Rdwr4; Peter Stein & Alison Tudor, Lone Star Reaches Deal 
to Sell KEB to Hana Bank, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703326204575616590933846442.html. 
 262 Cynthia J. Kim, Ex-ministry Official Acquitted of Selling KEB . . . at Low Price, 
KOREA HERALD (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101014000947. 
 263 Stein & Tudor, supra note 261; Song, supra note 261. 
 264 Kim, supra note 261.  However, he was sentenced to an eighteen-month jail term for 
other crimes (such as accepting about $50,000 from one of the bank’s suppliers).  Id. 
 265 Korea used to be the eleventh largest economy in the world before the Asian financial 
crisis.  South Korea’s Meltdown, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 1997), 
http://www.economist.com.hk/node/108827 (“As other countries struggled to contain the 
financial crisis that has swept the region, policymakers from Thailand to Hong Kong realised 
that South Korea’s economy, the world’s 11th largest, was on the brink.”). 
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pay was not made available to him.  In the U.S. pay system, Lee would not 
have risked imprisonment to receive such a “small” amount of money. 
In sum, while generous severance pay is legally permissible in the 
United States, it could be treated as a “bribe” (at least by the public opinion 
and prosecutors) in other countries.
266
  Of course, there is certainly public 
outcry regarding the exorbitant level of pay for executives in the United 
States.  In countries with a strong ethos of social democracy or 
egalitarianism, however, the public exudes much more serious political 
resistance to high pay for corporate insiders.  The public sentiment in these 
countries is: how dare corporate insiders who underperform and incur the 
change of control receive even a $1 severance pay while most employees 
suffer from massive layoffs arising from the merger or acquisition.  Without 
a sufficient amount of severance pay available, corporate insiders—either a 
CEO or a controlling shareholder—have two choices.  The first option is 
that they agree with a friendly deal and receive a relatively small amount of 
money functionally equivalent to the U.S. severance pay.
267
  The second 
option is to resist any type of M&A.  As for the first option, corporate 
insiders realize that they may even face criminal punishment.  Although 
they might ultimately be found not guilty, they risk the possibility of 
lengthy criminal trials.  In addition, their reputations could be irreversibly 
damaged, making it practically impossible for them to return to the business 
world.  Therefore, resisting any type of M&A is often the only available 
alternative to corporate insiders.  Without sufficient compensation, 
corporate insiders have virtually no reason to initiate negotiations for a 
M&A that will take their jobs.  Consequently, when it is imported to a 
country with social democracy or egalitarianism, the pill—the most 
effective takeover defensive device—is likely to quell almost all M&A 
deals in the domestic economy. 
B.  Control Premium and Friendly Deals 
The previous subpart mainly focused on the role of executives’ 
compensation in M&A transactions.  Outside the United States, although 
professional managers run some widely-held corporations, dominant 
shareholders are usually key players in strategic transactions.  Of course, 
controlling shareholders are often corporate executives as well, and 
executive compensation is important to them.  However, controlling 
shareholders are more interested in control premiums than executive 
compensation when they sell corporations to a prospective acquirer, since 
 
 266 In this sense, the U.S. severance pay could be characterized as a “legally permissible 
bribe.” 
 267 Mr. Lee’s case in KEB is an example.  See supra notes 261–265 and accompanying 
paragraph. 
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the amount of money involved in the sale of control is generally larger than 
it is for executive pay. 
1.  Total Value of Control (and Control Premium) 
Suppose that a dominant shareholder has significant votes in a 
corporation, but they do not amount to a majority (e.g., 30% votes).  She is 
not perfectly insulated from a threat of acquisition without a pill, so a 
prospective acquirer has a chance (albeit a small one) to take over the 
corporation by purchasing shares in the market.  Suppose that her 
jurisdiction implements a pill in its legal system.  Then, it will be almost 
impossible for a prospective acquirer to take over the corporation in a 
hostile way.  The only viable option would be to pay the dominant 
shareholder for the sale of control with a sufficient premium (which will 
change the controlling shareholder’s intention about remaining in control).  
The problem is how “sufficient” the premium should be. 
In general, a controlling shareholder has two sources of “utility” (or 
happiness) from managing a corporation: (1) the pecuniary benefits and (2) 
non-pecuniary benefits (NPB), e.g., social prestige, reputation, psychic 
utilities, and social influence, including political power.
268
  The pecuniary 
benefits to a controlling shareholder can be divided further into two sub-
categories.  One is monetary benefits distributed to all shareholders 
(including a controlling shareholder) according to their pro-rata economic 
stake in a corporation (e.g., capital appreciation of the stock as well as 
dividends); in other words, “pro-rata pecuniary benefits” (PPB).269  The 
other is monetary benefits available exclusively to a controlling shareholder 
irrespective of her fraction of economic interest in a corporation.
270
  These 
benefits can be referred to as “exclusive pecuniary benefits” (“EPB”).271 
Then, the total value of control (TV) that the current controlling shareholder 
 
 268 For a more detailed explanation of non-pecuniary benefits see Gilson, supra note 101; 
Kang, supra note 171; Kang, supra note 226. 
 269 See Kang, supra note 226, at 118–23 (expressing PPB as ND0). 
 270 In other words, a controlling shareholder can transfer corporate value to her own 
pockets at the expense of non-controlling shareholders.  See Simon Johnson, Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, AM. ECON. REV., May 
2000, at 22, 22–23 (“First, a controlling shareholder can simply transfer resources from the 
firm for his own benefit through self-dealing transactions. . . . Second, the controlling 
shareholder can increase his share of the firm without transferring any assets through dilutive 
share issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, creeping acquisitions, or other financial 
transactions that discriminate against minorities.”). 
 271 See Kang, supra note 226, at 118–23 (expressing EPB as SD0).  The current 
controlling shareholder is going to be paid cash flows of both PPB and EPB infinitely if she 
is a family controlling shareholder whose heir is expected to inherit the control power of a 
corporation.  As to an infinite time horizon of a controlling shareholder through family 
inheritance, see Gilson, supra note 236. 
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can enjoy is the sum of PPB, EPB, and NPB.
272
  She will sell control only if 
the payment a prospective acquirer offers is more than TV.  
 
Table 2 
TV (Total Value of Control) = PPB + EPB + NPB 
2.  Issues Related to the (Subjective) Value of Non-Pecuniary Benefits of 
Control 
The above formula for TV is based on the assumption that NPB is 
capitalized in monetary terms.  However, imagine that a current controlling 
shareholder places NPB at a value that is “priceless” (or “prohibitively 
high”).  An extreme form of the “endowment effect”273 can explain this 
possibility.  To a current controlling shareholder, a corporation is her own 
corporation that has been built and developed for a long time; accordingly, 
she places more subjective value on control and NPB than a prospective 
purchaser.
274
  Thus, a current dominant shareholder with priceless NPB 
would not sell the control of a corporation without regard to how much a 
third party offers.  To such a controlling shareholder, the only successor 
may be her own children who share her genes and protect her legacy.  To a 
controlling shareholder who is not willing to sell control of a corporation, a 
pill can make her more insulated from the risk of a hostile takeover.  With 
priceless NPB and a pill, a friendly sale of control would not often take 
place as well. 
Consider other cases where a current controlling shareholder is willing 
to sell control in exchange for the corresponding premium.  Put differently, 
now NPB is not priceless.  Thus, if a pill is adopted, a controlling 
shareholder is able to use it as a price negotiation tool for control.  Even in 
those cases, if there is no buyer who is willing to pay such a premium, a 
 
 272 More precisely, control premium which exclusively belongs to a controlling 
shareholder is only EPB + NPB.  PPB is not a component of control premium available to 
only a controlling shareholder since pro-rata pecuniary benefits are shared with the other 
shareholders. 
 273 “Endowment effect” refers to “the fact that people often demand much more to give 
up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.”  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. 
Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991).  As to the concept of the endowment effect, 
Kahneman et al. relied on one of Richard Thaler’s articles.  See Toward a Positive Theory of 
Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).  If a controlling shareholder’s 
endowment effect is extreme, her psychic value of her controlled corporation is priceless.  
Thus, she would not sell control of her corporation to an outsider. 
 274 A well-known example of the endowment effect is that of an owner of a coffee mug.  
To part with the mug, the owner requires more compensation than it is worth.  See generally 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). 
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transaction of control sale would not often take place.
275
  As to large 
corporations in particular, there are several reasons why there are not many 
potential buyers of control.  For example, as Professor Merritt Fox explains, 
“A typical acquirer does not—mostly is not able to—buy a large 
corporation like IBM, but a company with small or mid-capitalization.”276  
Even if an acquirer can afford it, she is reluctant to take a high risk by 
purchasing a large corporation with a high premium.
277
  Perhaps the 
potential acquirer does not want to “put too many eggs in one basket.” 
In addition, as I explain elsewhere, NPB could be deemed a luxury 
good that only relatively wealthy “consumers” (generally, controlling 
shareholders in large corporations) can “consume.”278  Thus, it is possible 
that the relative value of the NPB of a large controlling shareholder is 
higher than that of a small controlling shareholder.
279
  This phenomenon 
makes a large corporation more expensive and less affordable to a 
prospective acquirer.  The endowment effect generates another limitation to 
a potential buyer since the controlling shareholder places high subjective 
value on control.
280
  Moreover, if a prospective acquirer is a foreign entity, 
she is subject to “familiarity bias”281 and would discount the value of 
 
 275 For example, Professor Merritt B. Fox explains a potential acquirer’s risk averseness 
in a takeover: 
A potential acquirer, in deciding whether it is worth paying what it would need to 
pay to acquire a target that the acquirer feels is mismanaged, must make an 
assessment of what the target would be worth in the acquirer’s hands.  This 
assessment is inherently risky and the acquirer’s management is likely to be risk 
averse. 
Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 567, 
571–72 n.11 (2000). 
 276 Professor Fox has also pointed out this phenomenon generally observed in the M&A 
market.  Fox, supra note 166. 
 277 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 275. 
 278 See Kang, supra note 226.  “[A luxury good has] an income elasticity of demand that 
is greater than 1: a 1 percent increase in income leads to more than a 1 percent increase in 
demand for a luxury good.”  HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 281 (W.W. Norton & Company ed., 7th ed. 2006). 
 279 As for NPB of a large controlling shareholder, see Kang, supra note 226.  The unit 
value of NPB becomes larger as the size of the corporation grows, so that, for example, a 
large corporation that is three times larger than a small corporation gives more than three 
times the psychic utility to a controlling shareholder than a small corporation does. 
 280 Compare an extreme form of the endowment effect and a normal form of the 
endowment effect.  Under an extreme form, the endowment effect makes the control 
premium “priceless.”  On the other hand, under a normal form, the endowment effect makes 
the control premium “expensive.” 
 281 In behavioral finance, “familiarity bias” is widely known as the tendency for investors 
to invest the vast majority of their capital in assets and securities that are familiar to them.  
As to the familiarity bias see Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. 
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control and NPB.  Due to the widened price gap between a seller and a 
buyer, it is less likely that a prospective acquirer would purchase the control 
of a large corporation.  In sum, if a pill is adopted and used as a price 
negotiation tool, a sale of control, particularly of a large corporation, would 
not often take place. 
3.  Issues Related to Egalitarianism 
The control premium is generally far higher than severance pay.
282
  For 
example, if Lee Kang-Won had been a controlling shareholder of KEB, 
instead of chief executive, he would not have considered selling control to 
Lone Star for only $1.5 million.  When the culture and norms of a 
jurisdiction do not allow a large income disparity (although large monetary 
compensation might be legally allowed), such a country is not likely to 
allow a control premium that is available only to a current controlling 
shareholder and that excludes the rest of the shareholders as well as other 
constituencies in a corporation.  This view is strengthened by the fact that a 
large fraction of the control premium is from exclusive pecuniary benefits 
(EPB), which a controlling shareholder receives by illicit self-dealing.  
These benefits might be socially endured as long as there is no apparent 
evidence for their presence.  However, when the value of illicit self-dealing 
is formally capitalized in the corporate control market and as a result a 
current controlling shareholder is paid in the form of money, this process 
may create large social and political problems.  Put differently, in a country 
with egalitarianism, a control sale could take place more easily when the 
control premium is equally shared with all shareholders according to their 
cash-flow rights.  Facing the de facto equal treatment rule in sale of control 
imposed by social norms (irrespective of whether such a legal doctrine 
exists in a jurisdiction), a current controlling shareholder would not have 
much reason to sell control to a third party in the first place; rather, she 
would like to remain as a controlling shareholder.
283
  The pill reinforces a 
 
STUD. 659 (2001). 
 282 While a typical top manager does not have a substantial amount of shares, a typical 
controlling shareholder does.  Thus, a controlling shareholder’s control premium takes into 
account her equity investment, which is not significant to a top manager.  In addition, when a 
controlling shareholder takes a top manager position in a corporation, the controlling 
shareholder’s control premium could include her severance pay as a manager as well.  In that 
sense, generally, the amount of money to a decision-maker in a friendly deal is larger in the 
form of a control premium available to a controlling shareholder than in the form of a 
severance pay available to a top manager. 
 283 Even if a controlling shareholder in a country with social democracy and 
egalitarianism is willing to sell the control despite all the aforementioned predicaments, there 
might be another barrier to a control sale, i.e., labor law.  If labor law strongly protects 
employees from layoffs, a potential acquirer has little incentive to purchase the control since 
layoffs are a primary source of synergy in M&A that an acquirer pursues. 
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controlling shareholder’s entrenchment. 
C.  Does the Pill Block Entire Sales of Control? 
As seen in this Part, in a country with a strong sense of social 
democracy and egalitarianism, a likely consequence of adopting a pill 
system is that corporate insiders (both executives and dominant 
shareholders) will use a pill as an entrenchment tool and fiercely resist any 
bid.  In addition, those corporate insiders have social and political 
justifications, which are often pretexts to use a pill to its full extent.  For 
example, by resisting any bid, they are deemed defenders of employees 
whose welfare would be affected adversely by an M&A.
284
  Since this 
corporate insiders’ position is well-supported in such a jurisdiction, the 
market for corporate control, which is deemed to be a market disciplinary 
device, would become less meaningful. 
Consequently, there are three alternatives when company performance 
is disappointing: (1) management is permitted to let the performance keep 
deteriorating until bankruptcy, which is the worst scenario; (2) when the 
situation is serious and M&A is considered inevitable, management may 
rely on fire sales of companies at a deeply depressed prices rather than 
high-premium sales gained in a normal M&A; or (3) underperforming 
corporate insiders would seek a government bailout in which they may 
remain or be replaced.  Although the pill would be likely to interfere with 
most M&A, the pill does not entirely block M&A as seen in (2).  Perhaps a 
fire sale is another form of friendly M&A.  However, since it is an 
involuntary friendly deal, it may be undesirable to a domestic economy. 
On the other hand, in a country with a weak sense of social democracy 
and egalitarianism, not only would a pill be used for entrenchment, but it 
may also be used as a price negotiation tool (which only favors a 
controlling shareholder).  As explained, however, it is plausible that a 
family controlling shareholder has a very high reserve price for her control 
(in particular for NPB) that few prospective acquirers are willing to pay. 
In this respect, there are two noteworthy global factors.  First, 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-sponsored entities that invest 
assets such as foreign reserves in domestic and international financial 
 
 284 In M&A transactions, it is often the case that many employees are laid off.  In Unocal, 
when deciding a defensive measure, directors can consider the impact of a takeover on 
constituencies other than shareholders (“i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally”).  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 
(Del. 1985).  This discretion to the board can be used as an entrenchment tool for an 
incumbent management team.  For example, a target board and managers can argue that 
since an M&A would be harmful to employees, they oppose an M&A, even if it creates more 
value. 




285—became an important new type of acquirer in the international 
M&A market.
286
  Since SWFs retain the vast amount of foreign reserves, 
they are capable of and willing to pay for control and NPB, even if the 
reserve price of a controlling shareholder is high.
287
  SWFs could be active 
in the market of fire sales as well.  Second, a drastic change in macro-
economic environments can give another chance to foreign entities to 
pursue cross-border M&A.  For example, suppose that Country A is under a 
systematic financial crisis.  Then, a target in Country A (even if a 
controlling shareholder uses a poison pill to enhance her negotiation 
leverage for the price) will become very attractive to a business entity in 
Country B (provided Country B is not under macro-level financial distress) 
for two reasons.  First, due to the financial crisis in Country A, a local 
controlling shareholder’s reserve price of control could be lowered.  
Therefore, purchasing control is more affordable to a prospective acquirer 
in Country B.  Second, an exchange rate system is distorted due to national 
financial difficulties so that the currency of Country A becomes drastically 
cheaper than the currency of Country B.  Consequently, a Country B 
business entity has enhanced purchasing power in terms of its domestic 




In sum, a pill adopted in a controlling shareholder regime would make 
control sales more difficult.  However, the pill would not entirely block 
M&A in such a jurisdiction.  Fire sales would still be available.  In addition, 
SWFs and business entities with favorable macro-economic environments 
could be potential acquirers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the United States, the “‘just say no’ [pill] was a much more 
problematic defense in the corporate governance world of the 1980s than it 
is today, with differently constituted boards and different incentive 
 
 285 See Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks, and Governments in the Global 
Crisis, Towards a New Governance of Global Finance?, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 333, 339 
n.15 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1347 
(2008). 
 286 During discussions with Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt, he hinted that sovereign wealth 
funds are willing to pay high control premiums for non-pecuniary benefits of control.  
Milhaupt, supra note 85. 
 287 SWFs become more interested in equity investments.  “Many governments have 
recently announced plans to shift investment strategies for sovereign assets from 
conservative holdings of government bonds to higher-risk/higher-return investments in 
equities or corporate acquisitions.”  Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 285, at 1347–48. 
 288 If a target in Country A is under a deep pressure of fire sales, an acquirer in Country B 
is able to reap a great deal of profits. 
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compensation regimes.”289  If a jurisdiction outside the United States 
considers adopting a pill system, it should take into consideration whether 
its legal and socio-economic institutions are close to those of the United 
States in the 1980s or post-1980s.  Without a highly developed legal and 
socio-economic infrastructure, the pill would remain a very “problematic 
defense in the corporate governance world” of such a jurisdiction.  In that 
sense, the pill should be adopted through “bundling” so that when such a 
jurisdiction “buys” the pill, it should “buy” other Delaware doctrines in 
relation to the pill. 
Market adaptation via executive compensation was another important 
reason why the pill did not quash a material fraction of M&A activities in 
the United States.  A similar consequence would not be expected in a 
country with a strong ideology of egalitarianism; even most friendly deals 
would be crowded out when such a country adopts a pill system.  The pill 
may enhance a controlling shareholder’s negotiation leverage, which 
increases her reserve price for sale of control.  Accordingly, a sale of 
control, another type of a friendly deal, may be impeded by a controlling 
shareholder’s higher reserve price.  Even if a sale of control takes place, 
however, most shareholders are excluded from sharing the benefits of a 
control sale if equal treatment is not required.  This phenomenon cuts 
against a core rationale of adopting the pill, i.e., protecting weak non-
dominant shareholders.
290
  Furthermore, when a jurisdiction complies with 
the equal treatment rule (either via legal requirement or a non-legal norm), 
it undercuts a controlling shareholder’s incentive to sell.  Then the newly 
imported pill system would also suppress the sale of control, with some 
exceptions (e.g., SWF-involved deals and fire sales incurred by 
idiosyncratic or macro-level systemic problems). 
In sum, importing a pill would cause too much of a chilling effect 
towards a market for corporate control.  Nonetheless, the defensive system 
without a pill may not be enough to protect control of business entities.  In 
that context, it is desirable to have an institution with expertise, impartiality, 
and efficiency to determine an allowable level of the pill’s deterrence on a 
case-by-case basis.  Unfortunately, such a sophisticated institution is 
impractical for many controlling shareholder countries.  As a crude 
solution, it may be worth considering a less preclusive defensive 
 
 289 Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 900. 
 290 One of the rationales of a poison pill is that a pill can protect value for all shareholders 
including weak non-controlling shareholders.  As a faithful agent for shareholders, a target 
board can use a poison pill to reject a low-ball bid from an outsider, which would be harmful 
to non-controlling shareholders as well as to a controlling shareholder.  However, if a pill is 
used only to protect a controlling shareholder who would like to capture the entire control 
premium for herself and the pill does not protect the remaining shareholders’ value, the 
rationale of utilizing a pill to protect the entire shareholders’ value would lose justification. 





  By proposing a theoretical framework, this Article calls for 
rigorous country-based studies in the near future to develop a 
“proportional” takeover defense system in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
 
 291 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, one possible solution is the Interco 
pill, which is less preclusive than the “just say no” pill.  Alternatively, after careful 
evaluation of the takeover doctrines in a particular jurisdiction, a new enactment such as the 
Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act may be useful (with/without a less powerful 
pill) as long as a drastic change of control in a corporation creates “national security” issues.  
See Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 
(Supp.1989)).  A careful review of a particular jurisdiction in an independent project should 
be done before enacting possible solutions. 
